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ABSTRACT 
 
Wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of many hosts called sensors. These 
sensors can sense a phenomenon (motion, temperature, humidity, average, max, min, etc.) 
and represent what they sense in a form of data. There are many applications for WSNs; 
including object tracking and monitoring where in most of the cases these objects need 
protection. In these applications, data privacy itself might not be as important as the privacy 
of source location. In addition to the source location privacy, sink location privacy should 
also be provided. Providing an efficient end-to-end privacy solution would be a challenging 
task to achieve due to the open nature of the WSN. The key schemes needed for end-to-
end location privacy are anonymity, observability, capture likelihood, and safety period. 
We extend this work to allow for countermeasures against multi-local and global 
adversaries. We present a network model that is protected against a sophisticated threat 
model: passive /active and local/multi-local/global attacks. This work provides a solution 
for end-to-end anonymity and location privacy as well. We will introduce a framework 
called fortified anonymous communication (FAC) protocol for WSN. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) consist of many nodes or hosts called sensors. A 
wireless sensor device is a simple autonomous host device. It can sense a phenomenon, 
convert the sensed information into a form of data, process the data and then transmit the 
data to an aggregator or a sink for further usage or analysis. The sensor host is very limited 
in terms of memory, storage space, computing power, communication capabilities, and 
battery lifetime [1-8]. Wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of many sensor nodes, 
which are distributed in a certain application area to inspect some phenomenon. Sensor 
nodes will be left unattended in most of the applications until energy of the batteries are 
completely depleted [9]. Quyan et al. [10] suggest that there are three research areas which 
require attention in the area of WSN: (i.) sensor sophistication and accuracy to fit different 
applications. (ii.) Performance, routing and data delivery, and (iii.) Data privacy, security 
and integrity.  
There are many different applications for sensor nodes. However, we are interested 
in monitoring and tracking applications in this work. The WSN consists of many sensor 
nodes that monitor a certain area and track the presence of certain objects of interest such 
as an animal in the wildlife, a patient or a doctor in a hospital, or a fellow soldier or a 
vehicle in the battlefield. When the sensor node senses the object, it will report the data to 
the sink (or to multiple sinks) either directly or through other neighboring sensors. A sink 
is a wireless base station (BS) that is much more powerful than a sensor node in terms of 
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storage capacity, power supply, communication capabilities and computing power.  The 
sink usually has two responsibilities, to control and manage the WSN and to collect 
(aggregate) the data from the sensor nodes. One of the most common applications 
discussed in WSN privacy is the Panda monitoring game [4, 11]. The system needs to 
provide source location privacy (SLP) for the sensors. When a sensor node detects a Panda 
in an area, it should report via a message, which is transmitted through intermediate nodes 
to the sink. In order to protect the Panda from hunters or adversaries (ADVs), we need to 
implement in place an efficient source location privacy protocol. In such a scenario, 
location privacy is much more important than confidentiality of sensed data itself. Source 
location privacy is even more important in military, homeland security, and law 
enforcement in addition to many civilian applications [12]. In addition, the WSN needs to 
provide sink location privacy (BLP) to protect the sink. 
  
Figure 1.1: The need to provide SLP and BLP in WSN. 
Figure 1.1 demonstrates the importance of source and sink location privacy in 
WSN. In the first application on the left, the hunter is tracking the overheard signals to 
capture location of the source where he will be able to capture the Panda. In the second 
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application on the right, the criminal is trying either to get to the asset (source of money) 
or to capture location of the police patrol / officer either to avoid him or to attack the officer.  
1.1. Research Problem 
Privacy in WSN is categorized into two categories [13, 14] as presented in 
Figure 1.2. The first category is content or data privacy, which usually focuses on data 
aggregation (sent from sources to the sink) and data query (sent from the sink to the 
sources). It provides for data confidentiality, integrity, freshness, non-repudiation and other 
privacy issues [4, 14]. The second category is context or contextual privacy. It involves 
location privacy, identity privacy, routing privacy, temporal/timing privacy and 
transmission-rate privacy. Location privacy involves hiding the location of a source node 
(SN) and the sink of the WSN. Identity privacy ensures that the identity of a SN remains 
secret. Routing privacy is to hide the traffic flow. Temporal privacy is concerned with 
hiding the timing relationship between incoming and outgoing traffic [4, 13]. Rate privacy 
maintains similar transmission frequency by SNs.   
 
 
Figure 1.2: Privacy Categories in WSN. 
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1.2. Research scope 
In this work, we shall focus on location privacy, which includes two categories, 
source location privacy and base-station location privacy. Achieving both source and base-
station location privacy is crucial for many applications in WSN.  BLP is very important 
because the sink acts as a gateway to the backbone network, thus it might be a single point 
of failure, especially if the network has only one sink. In addition, the sink is the controller 
(or the brain) of the WSN, so if an adversary compromises the sink, it can run many Denial 
of Service (DoS) attacks or other similar active attacks which could cause the whole 
network to collapse [13]. The sink also could have very sensitive data that no one can afford 
compromising, especially if it is a single data aggregator from all the sensors in the 
network. Compromising the sink could enable the adversary to track the transmission back 
to the source location. Consequently, BLP is important for the privacy of the SLP itself. 
SLP is much more crucial in certain applications compared to BLP. It is obvious that the 
life of the Panda in the habitat or the soldier in the battlefield depends very much on SLP. 
The existence of deterministic or highly probabilistic SLP is a core requirement in many 
applications. We have seen many applications refrain from using WSN due to the weak 
SLP. Therefore, providing concrete solutions for SLP would lead to using WSN in many 
future applications. Some of the literature discuss anonymity, untraceability and 
unlinkability. Pfitzmann et al. [15] indicates that anonymity is the state of being 
unidentifiable within a set of objects. Untraceability is the inability of an adversary to trace 
individual data flows back to the sink or the source.  Ulinkability is to prevent any adversary 
from learning the identities of the sources or the sink at the same time. 
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Providing concrete end-to-end location privacy is a very complicated problem 
because of the open nature of the transmission media in WSN. The effectiveness of a 
solution will depend on whether the sensor node is mobile or static. Another important 
factor is the nature of the adversary. The adversary could be local, multi-local or global. It 
could be invasive or non-invasive. The variety of complex scenarios and applications is the 
reason for exploring many solutions for SLP and BLP. Unfortunately, in some solutions, 
one cannot provide privacy for both SLP and BLP concurrently, which requires a 
compromise in order to achieve better results for one over the other. We found from the 
literature that most of the proposed schemes usually focus on either SLP or BLP with 
significant interest on the SLP problem.  
The first work to classify context privacy was done by Kamat et al. [16, 17], where 
they addressed the Panda hunter game. They claim that the routing scheme is responsible 
to hide source location of a subject. They have used two metrics to measure SLP: safety 
period and capture likelihood. Safety period is the number of messages that a source sends 
before it is captured. The capture likelihood is the probability that an adversary can capture 
the source within a certain period.  
There are generally, two ways to locate a source using passive attacks: traffic 
analysis [13, 18] and packet tracing [13, 19, 20]. The traffic analysis can determine the 
location of sources or sink by analyzing the traffic. As an example, the volume of packets 
near the sink will be higher compared to the volume of packets near normal SNs. Packet 
tracing can be used to find the source location because adversaries may use radio-frequency 
localization techniques to perform a hob-by-hop trace. The adversary can move quickly 
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during packet trace. In addition, it works very well to trace mobile nodes due to its fast 
response compared to traffic analysis [13, 19]. One of the most important factors for 
designing a scheme or a protocol for SLP and BLP is the nature of threat / attack model 
and the adversary capabilities. Conti et al. [4] presented a classification for adversarial 
capabilities. They classified the adversary based on four properties. 
1. The behavior of the adversarial node, as presented in Figure 1.3  
a. Access level: Internal or external, 
b. Interference: active or passive, 
c. Compliance: semi-honest or dishonest. 
2. View of the network, as presented in Figure 1.4: 
a. Global adversary or laptop class adversary [10], 
b. Local adversary or mote class adversary [10], 
c. Multi-local adversary or semi-global adversary [21]. 
3. Resources: 
a. Memory, 
b. Data storage, 
c. Computation and processing power, 
d. Device rich: antennas, spectrum analyzers, GPS [22]. 
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4. What the adversary knows about the WSN: 
a. The topology of WSN, 
b. Location of a SN or a sink, 
c. Identity of some SNs or a range of identities, 
d. Routing schemes/algorithms/protocols, 
e. Keys or other encryption functions and information, 
f. Events distribution /schedule, 
g. Other related information to the WSN. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Behavior of the adversary in WSN. 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Adversary view in WSN. 
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1.3. Motivation behind the research 
Most of the previous research focus on providing either SLP or BLP. Very limited 
approaches in the existing literature addressed end-to-end privacy, which is a core 
requirement for many applications. As will be explained in following section, we propose 
a fortified framework that provides privacy under a strong threat model.  
1.4. Potential Contributions of the proposed research  
We provide a framework that will be tested against other solutions using the 
following metrics: 
Security and entropy: The probability that the adversary successfully identifies the 
source, the intermediary SNs or the sink 
Energy cost: What would be the cost for an event message to be sent from a source 
to the sink. This will include both the computational and communicational cost.  
Storage and memory cost: What size of memory is needed, considering the fact that 
the SNs need to store some information about the network, topology and the neighborhood. 
Delivery time: What would be the time (or delay) to send an event message from 
the source to the destination? 
Safety period: How long it takes the adversary to capture the first sensor node in 
the network. 
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Our proposed framework provides a modular system that is configured for a variety of 
network models and threat models. The framework will provide anonymity, authentication, 
temporal privacy and transmission rate privacy. 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
SURVEY 
 
There are many solutions, which have been presented to solve the problems of SLP 
and BLP.  Li et al. [14] discussed some of the solutions for SLP but they did not aim to 
create a survey. The comprehensive survey for SLP was presented in the work by Conti 
[4], where they categorized the solutions into eleven groups. They have discussed many 
solutions and compared them in terms of power consumption, the attack / threat model, 
view of the network, exposed information, and efficiency in providing location privacy. 
They also discussed some issues that each solution exhibits. They have listed the following 
categories for solutions: 
Random walk: trying to counter traffic analysis and hop-by-hop packet tracing by 
making the path of the transmitted packets completely random. The SN randomly forwards 
the packet to one of the neighbors based on a certain probability. To enhance SLP, random 
walk could incorporate other techniques such as dummy messages to improve the safety 
period [4, 16, 23-32].  
Geographic routing: routing the packets to destination according to the geographic 
information available in the WSN [4, 22, 33]. 
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Delay: exhibiting timing / temporal privacy, which provides location privacy by 
making timing analysis attack or a hop-by-hop trace attack unfeasible. The adversary 
cannot correlate the incoming traffic to the outgoing traffic of a SN [4, 34, 35]. 
Dummy data sources: obfuscate the real data traffic to divert the adversary; some 
nodes send dummy packets for every real packet sent out. Dummy packets do not contain 
any useful data. The adversary cannot decrypt either the fake or the real data so it will not 
be able to distinguish which one is the real packet. Such schemes could work very well to 
protect against global adversaries [4, 10, 11, 16, 36-51]. 
Cyclic Entrapment: Many nodes act as fake data sources, which form a loop inside 
the WSN. Fake traffic loops in a cyclic route with no decided start or end for the loop. This 
will confuse any local adversary within these loops and makes it almost impossible to trace 
back hop-by-hop to the source [4, 52, 53].  
Anonymization: Having the ID’s of SNs anonymous makes communication 
untraceable and in some case unobservable. The anonymization could be achieved by either 
aggregation or pseudonyms [12, 24, 28, 54-58]. 
Cross-layer routing: This scheme will use sub layers below the network layer for 
communication; such as using control messages from the medium access control (MAC) 
layer. Such techniques are very useful also to enhance energy consumption. Unfortunately, 
they are good against local adversaries only presuming the adversary does not have the 
ability to inspect lower level messages such as beacon frames [4, 59]. 
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Separate path routing: Having a separate route for packets will complicate hop-by-
hop tracing because the packets of one SN do not follow the same route. The adversary 
cannot hear all the packets due to its limited hearing range or due to being far from the 
source. The adversary needs to listen to multiple packets before it can locate the source 
while it is moving hop-by-hop towards the source [4, 60]. 
Network coding: SN not only originates or receives a packet, but it is allowed to do 
some computations on the packet before sending it out to the next hop. The computation 
could imply encoding/re-encoding. The input and output packets are unlinkable which 
makes it harder for the adversary to do a traffic analysis attack [4, 61, 62].   
 Limited node detectability: These schemes work on the physical layer of the WSN 
to hide the location of the SN or the presence of transmission. One way is to silence the SN 
so it is much harder for the adversary to locate it. Another way is to lower the radio 
transmission power so that the local adversary could not hear the transmission [4, 63-67]. 
There are many other solutions, which could entail multiple schemes to achieve 
SLP or BLP. Each solution usually presumes a certain network model, threat model, and 
routing model. One cannot find a standard network model, routing model or threat model. 
Most of the solutions presume static SNs and very few tolerate mobility. In addition, the 
topology is not standardized so some work assume tree topologies and some others assume 
clustered topologies. This diversity in the pre-setup of the network makes it hard to 
compare the outcomes of the provided solutions for location privacy and anonymity. 
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2.1. Anonymity literature survey: 
Anonymity is an old issue that was discussed for mobile networks, Ad Hoc 
networks and, Internets. Recently, it has become a concern for WSNs. We have identified 
most of the literature discussing solutions for anonymity in WSN. We have included them 
chronologically in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Solutions for SLP using anonymity. 
No Scheme View of 
the 
adversary 
Anonymity 
technique 
Passive attacks Active 
attacks 
1 SAS & CAS [54] Global Pseudonyms Eavesdropping, SN compromise, 
limited traffic analysis 
- 
2 HIR & RHIR 
[55] 
Global Pseudonyms Eavesdropping, SN compromise, - 
3 APR [56] Local Pseudonyms Eavesdropping, hops-tracing SN 
compromise 
4 DCARPS & 
Global DCARPS 
[12] 
Global Pseudonyms Eavesdropping, hops-tracing - 
5 ACS [28] Local Pseudonyms Rate monitoring, time 
correlation, identity analysis, 
hops-trace 
- 
6 MQA [57] Global Aggregation Eavesdropping, hops-tracing Packet 
injection 
7 PhID [4, 58] Local Pseudonyms Eavesdropping, traffic analysis - 
8 EAC [68] Global Pseudonyms Eavesdropping, traffic analysis DoS, SN 
compromise, 
Traffic 
injection 
 
Misra et al. [54, 69] introduced two solutions for anonymity using pseudonyms in 
order to counter the traffic analysis of a global adversary in WSN. The first scheme is called 
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the simple anonymity scheme (SAS) [4], where SNs communicate using pseudonyms. A 
large pseudonym space is created and shared by all the SNs. Every SN will get a subspace 
before deployment. The sink knows which subspace belongs to which SN. The WSN 
consists of clusters where each cluster has a cluster head and SNs. 
A SN stores two ranges of pseudonyms for each neighbor, one range for uplink 
(towards the sink) and the other range for downlink. The SN uses index i within its table to 
know which range is used for that specific neighbor. The pseudonym is mapped to the 
shared key used for encryption and decryption of the messages. When a SN wants to send 
a message to a neighbor within the cluster, it chooses one of the outgoing pseudonyms 
concatenated with index i as the destination, which is also concatenated with the message 
encrypted using the shared key mapped to the used pseudonym in the table.   
SAS uses high memory to store pseudonyms so another scheme was introduced to 
reduce the amount of storage used at the expense of a higher computation for pseudonyms. 
The scheme is called cryptographic anonymity scheme (CAS) [69]. In CAS, nodes use a 
keyed hashed function to generate the necessary pseudonyms. To generate a pseudonym 
for a neighbor, SN uses the shared key with a seed known by both the SN and the neighbor 
to generate the necessary pseudonyms. 
Ouyang et al. [55] introduced two solutions for SLP. The first solution is hashing-
based ID randomization (HIR) which is a solution for CAS in case a SN is compromised. 
The SN communicates with a neighbor using the hash value (HV) of the neighbor. A  
SN creates HV for each neighbor. It uses a keyed hash function. It also creates a HV to 
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communicate with the sink, based on the SN’s ID and a pairwise shared key (shared with 
the sink). The HV will be renewed by key-hashing the current HV with the shared key. 
The second solution from Ouyang et al. [55]  is called reverse hashing based ID 
randomization (RHIR). SN’s generates all the hash values, HV’s, and store them as a chain. 
SN’s use the HVs in reverse order and use the HV’s to communicate in the same way as in 
HIR. When a HV is used, it will be dropped out. HIR and RHIR provide SLP in a dense 
network. 
Sheu et al. [56] introduced Anonymous Path Routing (APR) which works against 
a global adversary. It hides the identities of the nodes and changes the encryption of each 
message at every hop. It uses three procedures: anonymous one-hop communication, 
anonymous multi-hop path routing and anonymous data forwarding. 
Nezhada et al. [12] introduced destination controlled anonymous routing protocol 
for sensor networks (DCARPS). It works to handle a local adversary under dense network 
only. It consists of five phases. In the first phase, every SN gets a unique ID, a random 
nounce DL shared with the sink, and a secret shared key k, which is shared between the SN 
and the sink. In the second phase, the sink learns the topology of the network. In the third 
phase, this sink calculates a tree that covers the network, with the sink as the root of the 
tree. The sink assigns labels for uplink communications to each of the SN’s. Each SN gets 
one outgoing and one incoming label. If a SN needs to send a packet towards the sink, it 
shall use its outgoing label embedded within the packet. The neighbor uses the label if it 
matches its incoming label to accept the message and then transmit it again towards the 
root (the sink) using its outgoing label. In the fourth phase, the sink fixes the routes. The 
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sink sends out a cryptographic onion message, which consists of multiple encrypted layers.  
Whenever the SN overhears a broadcast onion over the network, it checks whether the 
onion contains the SN’s DL as a destination. If that is the case then it accepts the onion 
message and then uses the new DL as the label and rebroadcast the message again. The 
onion message is kept forwarded until every SN has its label. In the fifth phase, the sensing 
and reporting shall start. The SN encrypts the data by the shared key with the sink and 
appends its own outgoing label to the packet. On the way to the sink, Each SN receives the 
packet and re-encrypts the data using the key it shares with the sink, and adds its own 
outgoing label and transmits the packet onward. This process is repeated until the packet 
arrives at the sink. The protocol defines how the sink can send command messages using 
downlink labels. Each SN uses a random back-off period to prevent collection before it 
tries to transmit the packet. 
Probabilistic DCARPS is similar to regular DCARPS, however, it has two versions. 
The SNs may have multiple outgoing labels and multiple paths towards the sink where 
each path has its own PathID. One version allows every intermediary SN to select a random 
path with a PathID to forward the packet to the sink, while in the second version only the 
source selects a certain PathID. 
Luo et al. [28] introduced a solution against a local adversary, called anonymous 
communication scheme (ACS). Each SN shares an individual key with each of its 
neighbors. The SN and its neighbor use a hash function with the shared key and the real 
ID’s of both to calculate the outgoing and incoming hidden identities. The hidden identities 
are updated periodically using the shared key. In addition, each SN stores a table with 
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multiple columns. The first column in the table contains the identity of each individual 
neighbor. The second column contains the sequence of the hashing, which indicates how 
many times the hash function is applied to the identity. The third column contains the 
current outgoing hidden identity of that neighbor. The fourth column contains the current 
hidden incoming identity of that neighbor. The SN can send a message to its neighbor after 
it encrypts the data with the shared key and addresses the packet to the incoming hidden 
identity of the neighbor. 
Di Pietro et al. [57] introduced max query aggregating (MQA). This method does 
not use significant computational overhead because it is based on data aggregation. It 
presumes that the network needs to report the maximum value. This also assumes the 
network is built as a hierarchical tree where the sink is the root of the tree. Every SN has a 
unique symmetric key shared with the sink. The SN senses data, which is an integer of i 
bits. The WSN goes through i rounds to gather the sensed value from all the SNs. 
Park et al. [58] introduced a solution called Phantom ID (PhID [4]), which is less 
computationally intensive compared to ACS. Each node has a real ID abbreviated as SID 
and a phantom ID abbreviated as PID. SNs share a pair-wise key with the neighbors. When 
a sensor is deployed, it uses two pre-distributed parameters, q and p, to calculate its PID 
using: PID = qSID mod p. Every SN shares its PID with its neighbors encrypted with the 
pairwise shared keys. Every SN stores a table, which contains the following about the 
neighbors: the neighbor’s PID, the neighbors SID, the direction; uplink or downlink. The 
SN exchanges its table with its neighbors. All the communications will use PID with a 
hidden vector, HV. The HV consists of the SID of the sender XOR-ed with the shared key 
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of sender and receiver, and XOR-ed with a random number, which both sender and receiver 
can generate. HV is updated regularly. When SN sends a message, it combines its PID, the 
HV, a timestamp, the destination’s ID, the encrypted data and a modified SMAC code in a 
message and sends it towards the sink. The sink uses PID, HV, and the adapted SMAC to 
check the authenticity and integrity of the message. SNs regularly update their PID and HV 
to further improve privacy. 
An important solution against a global adversary introduced by Chen et al. [68] 
called efficient anonymous communication (ECA) provides send, link and sink anonymity. 
The solution consists of three phases. The first phase is the network pre-deployment, in 
which each SN gets preloaded with parameters  and , two hash functions H1 and H2, 
and a unique ID. The second phase is the network initialization. Each SN gets to know its 
location and the distance to the sink by metric of the number of hops. Every SN creates a 
global anonymous identity (AI) based on the hash function H1, the parameter , and the 
node’s unique ID. Then the node creates an anonymous broadcast identity BAI base on the 
hash function H1, the parameter , and the node’s ID. Then, it calculates an anonymous 
one-hop identity (OHAI) and an anonymous acknowledgement identity (AAI). At the third 
phase, SNs start sensing and reporting data. A source SN chooses one of the neighbors and 
sends the data with the shared OHAI address of that neighbor. The data will be encrypted 
with the shared key between the source and the neighbor. The data will also be encrypted 
with the key shared between the source and the sink. The sink will recognize the source by 
its AI identity included in the message. AAI is used for acknowledgement. OHAI will be 
updated after each successful transmission. BAI is used for anonymous broadcasting. 
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2.2. Providing temporal privacy through fake sources  
We know that anonymity is not enough to achieve a fortified end-to-end privacy. 
There are some solutions based on fake data sources where SNs send out fake packets to 
other nodes within the network. Some literature call them dummy packets. A fake packet 
does not contain any real information about any real events but it helps to obfuscate the 
real traffic and to divert the adversary by mimicking the presence of a fake source. The 
literature shows reasonable solutions using the fake source. Some of them are designed to 
handle local adversary and some of them are suitable for global adversary. Some of the 
literature presume a certain routing scheme, topology, or network and threat models. Some 
of the literature used in this work are explained hereafter. 
Alomair et al. [70] presented two algorithms: A-real and A-fake. A-real is used 
when there are real events in the WSN. In this case, SNs embed real traffic within fake 
traffic, based on statistical tests. A-fake is used when the SNs do not detect any real events. 
In this case, the SNs presume the presence of fake subjects by presuming fake events, 
which they are then embedded within the dummy traffic. The adversary will see no 
difference between A-fake and A-real.  
Ouyang et al. [10] introduced three different solutions to handle the global 
adversary problem. The first solution is the globally optimal algorithm (GOA). Each SN 
has a pseudo random number generator that defines the interval time. If the SN has data, it 
will send it at the end of the time; otherwise, it will send a fake message. SNs share the 
interval times for all the nodes in the WSN so it can calculate the shortest path to the sink. 
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The SN needs to know the complete topology of the network, which is very memory 
consuming. 
The second solution by Ouyang et al. [10], is the heuristic greedy algorithm (HGA) 
where SNs follow the same procedure as in GOA except that the SN does not know the 
complete topology, but it only has the information of the location and the seeds of its 
neighbors. The source SN can calculate the best node among the neighboring SNs to 
forward the packet to it. 
The third solution by Ouyang et al. [10] is the probabilistic algorithm (PBA) where 
nodes still follow the procedure of HGA, except that they don’t send fake messages at the 
end of every interval. It uses probability p to decide whether to send a fake message or not. 
The value of p will reduce the communication overhead at the expense of SLP. 
2.3. Providing temporal privacy through delay  
We can enhance SLP and BLP by having temporal privacy, which creates hop-by-
hop trace attack or timing analysis attack. It works very well for the monitoring of moving 
objects [4]. There is some literature that addressed this using issuing packet delay 
techniques. 
Hong et al. [34] introduced probabilistic reshaping (PRESH) to counter the 
adversary that uses timing analysis techniques. A SN shares a key with its neighbors for 
encryption. Packets are padded to have the same size. The identity of the source SN is 
included in the header without encryption while the identity of the receiver is hidden. When 
a source SNi has a packet to send, it sends the packet directly to an intermediary SNj where 
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it delays the packet before it forwards it again to the next hop. The delay is random and 
follows an exponential distribution, which can be set based on the protocol parameter. 
Received packets will be queued and sent in arbitrary order due to the random delay. The 
adversary cannot tell after the queued packet was sent, the source of the packet because the 
network will have many packets transmitted during the delay time. The setup of parameter 
 is used to adjust between timing privacy and deliver latency. If a node has only one 
packet in its buffer while there are no other transmissions in the neighborhood, then 
transmitting it will give the adversary 50% chance to guess if the packet was sent by a 
source or intermediary node. Hong et al. [34] introduced and upgraded PRESH extended 
probabilistic reshaping (exPRESH) to counter such a scenario. The SN will delay the 
packet in its buffer again up to D time. Thus, the original exponential delay should be 
introduced in PRESH and the delay introduced by exPRESH. 
Kamat et al.[35] introduced rate controlled adaptive delaying (RCAD). The payload 
is encrypted; however, the header is a plaintext. The header includes the ID of the source 
SN and the ID of the last intermediary SN as well. Every SN should delay its packets for a 
random amount of time after which the packet is sent to the next hop. The delay will vary 
in every node according to a statistical distribution. The intermediary SN fills up its queue 
and delay the transmission for variable delay periods. The nodes also need to count for the 
fact that the buffer could be filled, which could cause data loss. 
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CHAPTER 3: PROBLEM STATEMENT AND 
RESEARCH PLAN 
 
3.1. System Model and Goals 
 In this work, we will provide a framework for End-To-End location privacy and 
anonymity. In any WSN, many SNs are distributed in the application area. The SNs sense 
some condition and then report the data back hop-by-hop to the sink, which we shall call 
it a base station (BS), hereafter, in this work. In this work, we will design a framework that 
provides the following security elements: 
1. Sender anonymity, 
2. Receiver anonymity, 
3. Link anonymity, 
4. Source location privacy (SLP), 
5. Base-station/sink location privacy (BLP), 
6. Timing privacy, 
7. Rate privacy, 
8. Route privacy, 
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9. Data privacy, 
10. Safety period and, 
11. Energy preservation. 
We take that the sorted priorities to achieve are as listed above. Thus, sender 
anonymity has a higher priority than receiver anonymity, which in turn has a higher priority 
than SLP and then BLP and, so on. There are many design constraints, one of which is the 
limitation in all the resources of the SN. This should include the battery lifetime, CPU 
capabilities, memory space, and storage capacity. We will consider all of the above 
limitations and we take into consideration the need to be very conservative and efficient. 
Anonymity in WSN aims to prevent any adversary from knowing the identities of the 
sender or the receiver prior to, during, and after the communication has taken place. This 
should include the source SN where it senses the phenomenon and sends data out, and the 
sink, which receives the data from the source SNs. The sink checks data integrity and 
correctness, and forwards it to the core network for further processing. Security of the sink 
is crucial for the security of the whole WSN. It works as the network controller and has 
other critical roles in the network. Security of the source SN in some applications is also 
more important than the sink’s, since any disclosure of its identity or location could be 
devastating, especially if that were to endanger the life of a soldier, a patient or an animal 
(the Panda game). Node anonymity is a complex situation that involves the sender 
anonymity, the receiver anonymity and the link anonymity. Without the triple anonymity, 
the adversary (or colluding adversaries) could compromise one or more SNs and possibly 
the base station. 
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Anonymity is crucial for SLP and for BLP, but it will not be enough, especially 
with the presence of global or colluding adversaries. The lifetime of a WSN is usually 
considered the lifetime of the first SN in the network that runs out of battery [12]. Thus, it 
is very important to have a fair distribution for the SNs. 
We have discussed in the introduction many techniques that could be used for 
privacy. Applying each of them or a bundle of them could help in increasing the security 
of the network, in particular, location privacy. It will also increase the safety period. 
However, our major concern is conserving the power consumption of the SNs to increase 
the overall lifetime of the WSN. Every extra bit of a packet sent will reduce the lifetime of 
the sensors. Unnecessary processing by the sensor such as encrypting, decrypting, hashing, 
formatting, error check, acknowledgement, fragmentation etc., will consume more energy. 
We also know that transmitting data consumes much more than processing the data. We 
should also plan to distribute the work on all the sensors, especially the intermediary nodes 
(forwarders), so that we can guarantee the longest possible lifetime and coverage for the 
spread area of the network (routing).  Applying a complex set of routing, key management, 
encryption, acknowledgement, packet walk, phantom nodes, delay, fake packets, etc., 
could help in improving the security, for sure, if they are designed to work together 
seamlessly. Depending on the adversary model and on the security level required, we can 
adopt a modular framework. As an example, in a relatively safe environment, we could 
apply light schemes and in a harsh environment, we can apply very sophisticated schemes. 
A relatively safe environment, here, refers to when the adversary is not very sophisticated 
and has limited capabilities compared to fully capable adversary in the harsh environment. 
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If we opt for a better lifetime of the WSN over the safety period, we can use light schemes, 
and if we need the most to provide security, then we can apply complex and fortified 
schemes. The decision should be made by the sink, the network brain. However, the SNs 
can report the condition of the network to the sink. The sink could accordingly apply 
reasonable configurations to achieve proper privacy and anonymity measures. That is, we 
adopt the closed loop system. 
We would like to divide our framework into multiple modules: 
1. Anonymity module, 
2. Data authentication and integrity, 
3. Temporal and rate privacy module, and 
4. Modular network. 
Each module can be applied with one or more modules depending on the network 
requirements. The system should have a bunch of inputs such as the nature of the 
adversaries in the network, the residual power in the nodes, the desired lifetime or safety 
period. Figure 3.1 illustrates the closed-loop form for the network. 
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Figure 3.1: Close-loop network in WSN. 
3.2. Network Model 
The WSN consists of tens to hundreds of small wireless sensors that are randomly 
distributed in the application area. The sensors are usually similar, low cost, battery driven, 
limited in memory, exhibit low computation capabilities and immobile, and they are not 
tamper resistant [54]. We assume bi-directional links where two nodes are considered 
neighbors if and only if they can hear each other [12].The network considers one sink which 
collects / aggregates the sensed data (stimuli) from all the SNs. The sink works as an 
interface for WSN  to the wired network [54]. We presume that the sink has unlimited 
power, enough memory, plentiful storage space, and great processing capabilities. Data 
packets generated by SNs are ultimately destined uplink to the sink and never destined to 
another SN. However, it could go through a multi-hop-path. Control packets can be sent 
from the sink, downlink, to the SNs by unicast or broadcast. To enhance BLP, the sink acts 
like any other SN in the network when it communicates with other SNs to make it 
indistinguishable. However, it is connected to a wired backbone network, which looks 
seamless to other SNs and to the adversaries. 
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Most of the literature show that the operation of WSN network goes through two 
or more phases. Nezhad et al. [12] provided six phases as an example. However, generally 
speaking, the WSN runs in three phases: pre-deployment phase, setup phase, and 
communication phase. During the pre-deployment phase, SNs are preloaded with all the 
keys, hash functions, IDs and other information needed to setup the network. It also makes 
sure the batteries are fully charged. Then the setup phase starts right after deployment of 
the SNs. We presume some safe period where SNs do some calculations and exchange 
some information required during the communication afterwards. In the communication 
phase, SNs sense data and send packets hop-by-hop to the sink. We assume that the SNs 
have the ability to obfuscate the addresses at the MAC level header [54, 71]. All sensors 
are loosely time synchronized [54]. 
If we are to seek end-to-end privacy, then the WSN will need a protocol for network 
topology discovery that allows the BS to view the global topology of the network without 
revealing the sink location [12]. The network protocols should aim to conserve energy to 
extend the lifetime of the network. An excessive use of security techniques or extra packet 
transmission would not help the problem of energy conservation. The network routing 
should achieve correctness, simplicity, robustness, stability, fairness, optimality and 
efficiency. As general framework for any WSN could include: 
1. Pre-deployment module, 
2. SNs distribution, 
3. Location discovery service, 
4. NTDP: Network topology discovery, 
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5. Link establishment: 
a. Tree, 
b. Clustered network, 
6. Key distribution module, 
7. Set-up module, 
8. Communication module: 
a. Unicast, 
b. Multicast, 
c. Broadcast 
d. Acknowledgement, 
e. Fake versus real messages 
9. Data security module, 
10. Privacy module for SN’s and the sink: 
a. Location Privacy, 
b. Identity privacy, 
c. Routing privacy, 
d. Timing privacy, 
11. Routing module, 
12. Node revocation and addition,  
13. Intrusion detection module,  
14. Mobility, 
15. Data aggregation, 
16. Synchronization: 
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a. Synchronized network, 
b. Time-loose network, 
17. Other modules. 
These modules and sub-modules interchange and interact depending on the design 
of the WSN. Some of the modules could be null in certain networks as well. For example, 
if there are only static SNs, then the mobility module does not exist. See Figure 3.2 for 
related modules in our proposed framework.  
 
Figure 3.2: Modules used in WSN. 
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3.3.  Attack / Threat model 
Any solution for privacy schemes will very much depend on the nature of traffic 
generated in the WSN and on the sophistication of the adversary trying to attack the 
network [12]. Our goal is to make it very hard for any adversary to identify privacy 
information about any packet sent from source to sink. The adversary nodes have very 
strong capabilities compared to SNs. They are resource-rich, having sufficient energy 
supply, good computation / processing capabilities, and sufficient storage memory. An 
adversary could run both passive and active attacks. We presume Kirchhoff’s Principle 
[72] for our framework, where the adversary knows everything about the system except 
the keys and IDs. The threat model will be able to launch both passive and active attacks. 
3.3.1. Passive attacks 
1. Eavesdropping: The adversary can overhear the messages but cannot decode them. 
2. Hop-by-hop trace: The adversary can trace back the packets by overhearing the 
messages until it gets to the source of the messages. 
3. Size correlation: It is a traffic analysis by trying to understand the relation between 
incoming and outgoing traffic of a SN based on the size of the packets. 
4. Time correlation: It is a traffic analysis by using the timing information of related 
traffic between two SNs and then finding a path from source to BS. 
5. Identity analysis: The adversary tries to link two or more overheard IDs to SNs. 
6. Rate monitoring: It is traffic analysis where the adversary looks for higher 
transmission rates as SNs get closer to source or BS.  
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7. Angle of arrival (AoA): This attack requires special hardware to measure the angle 
of arrival to find out which direction a transmitting SN lies. 
8. RSS: It requires a special hardware for the adversary to measure the signal strength 
that the adversary receives from the transmitting SN. The signal strength could be 
used to calculate the distance between the adversary and the SN. 
9. Content analysis attack: The length of the control packets and data packets must be 
a constant and equal on all the links in order to stop content analysis attack [12]. It 
is even better if there is a random data packet format; that means similar packet 
length but not repeated format after each hop. 
3.3.2. Active attacks 
1. Denial of service (DoS): Adversary blocks all further communications in SNs. 
2. Replay attack. 
3. Forging attack. 
4. Active node compromise: The adversary uses the compromised SN to influence 
the protocol or to detect the presence of other nodes. Adversary also can destroy 
the SN and remove it from the network. 
5. Packet alternation: The adversary can intercept a packet, alter it and send it to the 
destination. 
6. Packet dropping: The adversary can drop packets. 
7. Packet injection: The adversary can insert unreal packets into the WSN. 
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We presume that only few compromised nodes could exist at one time due to 
implementing a protocol to detect compromised SNs. There are mechanism to remove 
compromised nodes from WSN [68, 73-76].  
3.3.3. View of the adversary 
We assume a global adversary, which can monitor the traffic of the entire network 
and can determine the node responsible for the initial transmission to report the event to 
the sink. Assuming a global adversary means: 
a. Worst-case scenario for area coverage: where colluding sensors can cooperate to 
cover the whole network area [70]. 
b. Worst-case scenario for timing: The coverage area of the adversary is not known 
at any time [70]. 
We also assume that the adversary is capable of observing SNs transmissions over 
extended periods. It is not, however, able to break the encryption algorithms used for 
securing data during transmission.  
3.4. Traffic model 
Depending on the application of the WSN, the traffic model could vary and thus 
the solution model needs to be adjusted accordingly. Nezhad et al. [12] discussed this issue 
and indicated that their proposed DCARPS scheme is designed for busy networks but also 
provided some solution for light networks. Some networks have abundant traffic where 
sensors detect and transmit many packets such as in environment tracking and monitoring 
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applications. Such networks can resist global eavesdroppers. Having abundant traffic in the 
network where many sources send data at one interval of time, makes it harder for the 
adversary to distinguish a specific data flow among others. The greater the data flow path, 
the harder it is for the adversary to decipher the identity of the sender. Some applications 
such as military monitoring, recovery operations and law enforcement provide few data 
streams during the normal operation. If there is one data flow path in the network, 
regardless of the routing scheme used, a global adversary can monitor all the packet 
transmissions and can detect the source as it generates any packet. It is very difficult to 
protect a scarce traffic WSN against a global eavesdropper [12]. In this work, we presume 
abundant traffic. 
3.5. Implementation and test plan 
As we have indicated above, the operation of the WSN goes through three phases, 
which we will discuss in details in the following sections. Our system is designed to 
achieve the security goals explained earlier. Our goal is to provide a maximum lifetime of 
the network and improve the safety period of the network as well. Optimally, we provide 
the six-element security scheme with no security breach for the maximum possible lifetime 
of the network. The framework is a closed-loop system. Depending on the design used, the 
lifetime of the batteries in the system will vary. The suggested system model needs to be 
comparable to the previous security systems in terms of energy consumption but also 
provide better security, in particular, SN anonymity, SLP and BLP. We have deigned the 
three modules and we did extensive simulations to test the performance of the framework. 
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CHAPTER 4: ANONYMITY 
The communication process is divided into three phases, namely: Pre-deployment 
phase, setup phase and communication phase. 
4.1. Pre-Deployment phase 
Prior to actual distribution of the SNs in the field of application, the SNs need to be 
tested, fully charged, and preloaded with some parameters. We will use subcase letters i 
and j to describe source and intermediary nodes consecutively.  We will use BS to describe 
the sink or the base station. Table 4. summarizes all the parameters and terms used in this 
work. 
4.2. Setup phase 
It is typical to presume the WSN is considered secure for some short period after 
the deployment of sensors and before the steady communication phase. Zhu et al. [77] 
presented that WSN has a lower bound on the time interval (Tmin) before the adversary is  
able to compromise a SN. During this time, the sensors can communicate and exchange all 
needed information safely. The sink needs to know the location of all the SNs participating 
in the WSN. Likewise, the SNs need to know their relative locations to the sink and to their 
neighbors. There are many localization schemes which, are proposed in the literature [54, 
68, 78, 79].  We presume the network will adopt one of the available efficient localization 
schemes. Localization allows each SN to know its smallest hop-count to the BS (HCibs).  
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Table 4.1: Reference of important parameters and terms used by FAC. 
Notation Definition Source 
IDi ID of sensor i Preloaded 
ai Random number shared between SNi & BS Preloaded 
bi Random number shared between SNi & 
neighbors 
Preloaded 
ci Random number shared between SNi & 
neighbors 
Preloaded 
H1 Hash function to create pseudonyms and the keys Preloaded 
H Hash function to create data digest Preloaded 
kibs Pair-wise key shared between SNi & BS Preloaded 
kbi Broadcast key for SNi Preloaded 
fkbi Fake broadcast key for SNi Preloaded 
N Number of SNs in WSN Learned 
Ni Number of neighboring for SNi Learned 
HCibs Hop-count between SNi & BS Learned 
PIDi Pseudonym ID shared between SNi & BS Calculated 
BPIDi Broadcast pseudonym ID Calculated 
aij Random value shared between SNi & SNj Calculated 
kij Pair-wise key shared between SNi & SNj Calculated 
OHPID ij Pseudonym ID shared between SNi & SNj Calculated 
APIDi ACK pseudonym ID for SNi Calculated 
FBPIDi Fake broadcast pseudonym ID Calculated 
Ti Table in SNi for shared parameters Calculated 
TIME_STAMP Time stamp Calculated 
SEQ_NO Sequence number for a message Calculated 
TTL Time to live Calculated 
MCG_LGTH Message size Calculated 
ઢ࢘ࢋ࢙࢏ࢊ࢛ࢇ࢒ Residual energy Calculated 
 XOR Operation Operation 
|| Concatenation operation Operation 
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4.2.1. Creating pseudonyms  
The key idea is to use pseudonyms instead of using real IDs for the SNs and the BS 
during communication. Therefore, one disposable pseudonym per one transmission is used. 
This way, the ADV cannot trace back to the source using multiple messages containing the 
real ID. There are five kinds of transmissions that could happen in the WSN: (i) Multi- hop 
transmission between SNi and BS, (ii) transmission between two sensor neighbors i and j, 
(iii) broadcast sent by SNi or BS, (iv) acknowledgement, and (v) fake broadcast. The 
process starts by creating a pseudonym ID for each SNi, we call it for short (PIDi) which 
is computed using expression below: 
PIDi = H1(IDi  ai)  (4.1) 
The SNi can calculate the broadcast pseudonym ID (BPIDi) according to the 
expression below: 
BPIDi = H1(IDi  bi)  (4.2) 
The SNi can calculate the fake broadcast pseudonym ID (FBPIDi) according to the 
expression below: 
FBPIDi = H1(IDi  ci)  (4.3) 
SNi should, by now, know its entire neighbor set (Ni). SNi will send a broadcast 
discovery message (Mdiscovery), to exchange parameters with all one-hop neighbors. The 
format of the message is stated in the expression below: 
Mdiscovery = Kdis(TTL || IDi || kibs || kbi || fkbi || ai  || bi || ci || i || HCibs) (4.4) 
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Where TTL should be 1 for this transmission. Kdis is a shared common encryption 
key to secure the discovery message. SNi will receive also a similar broadcast message 
from SNj and from all other neighbors. Both SNi and SNj will calculate a new random value 
(aij) according to the expressions below: 
aij = H1(IDi  IDj)  (4.5) 
Both SNi and SNj will calculate also a new pair-wise key kij according to the 
expression below: 
kij = H1(kibs  kjbs)  (4.6) 
SNi also calculates broadcast pseudonym ID for SNj (BPIDj) according to 
expression (2) since SNi has already received the values of IDj and bj through Mdiscovery. It 
also calculates the one-hop pseudonym ID (OHPID ij) shared between SNi and SNj as 
expressed in the expression: 
OHPID ij = H1(ai  aj)  (4.7) 
Finally, acknowledgement pseudonym ID for SNi (APIDi) will be calculated 
according to the expression:  
APIDi =H1(IDi)  (4.8) 
SNi will create a table (Ti) which contains the shared values with the neighbors as 
listed in Table 4.2. In conclusion, we have replaced the ID with quintuple pseudonyms to 
reference the SN during the communication. 
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4.2.2. Deleting security information 
After storing all required pseudonyms, parameters and keys in Ti, it would be the 
time to delete all unnecessary information for the purpose of security [7]. In addition, it 
will release some memory storage space [68, 80]. Most importantly, SNi will delete IDi 
and HCibs, which could be critical information for the adversary. In addition, SNi shall 
delete all discovery messages. 
Table 4.2: Shared values among sensor neighbors. 
Information in Ti per each neighbor Tuple for SNj 
Shared random number aij 
Shared broadcast random number b j 
Shared fake broadcast random number c j 
Shared broadcast key BPIDj 
Shared fake broadcast key FPIDj 
Shared one-hop key kij 
Current one-hop pseudonym ID OHPID ij 
Link direction linkij 
Residual energy level j 
 
4.3. Communication phase 
During the communication phase, when sensing and sending data to the BS takes 
place, there are seven operations that continue until network lifetime ends. These 
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operations are: (i) Sense and send a message to a neighbor, (ii) forward a message hop-by-
hop, (iii) broadcast a real message, (iv) acknowledgement, (v) broadcast a fake message, 
(vi) SN removal, and (vii) SN addition. A SN will have three roles, in terms of data 
transmission, during the communication phase: (i) Role as a sensor, (ii) as a message 
forwarder, and (iii) as a broadcaster. In the following sections, we will use SNi as a source 
node and SNj as a neighbor to the source. 
4.3.1. Transmission as a sensor 
When SNi senses data, it needs to send a message hop-by-hop to the BS. The SNi 
only recognizes itself by its (PIDi), and the BS will recognize the source of the message by 
its PIDi as well. Thus, the PIDi of the source needs to be included in the message until it is 
received by the BS. Consequently, the PID of a sensor will be updated after every 
transmission. The SNi needs to select one neighbor from Ni to forward the message to. The 
selection process goes through a probabilistic protocol which guarantees that SNi does not 
use one neighbor all the time when forwarding its data; first, for routing privacy, and 
second for increasing the lifetime of the WSN. SNi will form the message in the following 
format: 
Mij = OHPIDij || Ekij (PIDi || Ekibs (Di))  (4.9) 
Where Di includes the sensed data. Once SNi knows that the message (Mij) is 
delivered to the the neighbor, it needs to dispose the current pseudonym PIDi and issue a 
new one for the next transmission as indicated in expression (4.10): 
PIDi = H1(PIDi  ai)  (4.10) 
 
 
40
In addition, both SNi and SNj will dispose the current OHPIDij and issue a new 
one for the next communication between the two neighbors according to expression (4.11): 
OHPIDij = H1(OHPIDij  aij)  (4.11) 
The message (M) will then be reformatted by the recipient SNj and again forwarded 
to the next node, say SNr, and so on, until it gets to the BS. If SNj was the BS, then the BS 
uses the shared one-hop key between the sensor and the BS, to decrypt the data and to get 
the PIDi which the BS can use to recognize the source SNi. Only at this point of time, BS 
can update the value of PIDi of SNi. It also reads the data (Di) which the BS can decrypt 
using kibs.  
4.3.2. Transmission as a forwarder 
When SNi sends the message one-hop uplink to the neighbor SNj, then SNj needs 
to forward the message to another intermediary node. Upon receiving Mij, SNj will match 
OHPIDij in its table, Tj. If there is no match, then the message definitely is not addressed 
for SNj and it will be dropped immediately. If it matches, then the message is decrypted 
using kij. The message will be forwarded to SNr after (M) is reformatted as in (4.12): 
Mjr = OHPIDjr || Ekjr (PIDi || Ekibs (Di))  (4.12) 
Right after the data is received by SNj and forwarded to the next one-hop SNr, the 
SNj updates the pseudonym OHPIDij. SNj now is ready to exchange another message 
with SNi using the new pseudonym OHPIDij. However, SNj is not yet ready to send data 
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to SNr since SNr does not update the OHPIDjr until (Di) is forwarded to the next hop, say 
NSv. See Figure 4.1 for the sequence of transmissions for a message from SNi to the BS. 
4.3.3. Acknowledgement 
As expected in data networks, message could be lost or could get corrupted. In 
either case, retransmission is required. Because SNs change PIDs after each transmission, 
synchronizing PIDs is crucial. Updating the pseudonyms depends on successful message 
delivery. Ideally, the source should update the pseudonyms only after making sure the data 
is received by the BS.   
However, the lack of direct connection between the source and the BS makes it a 
bit complicated process. The BS cannot send direct acknowledgement to the source if it is 
multiple hops away. We have to depend on multiple acknowledgements along the path 
between the source and the BS. SNi needs to calculate the acknowledgement pseudonym 
ID (APIDi) according to expression (4.13): 
APIDi = H1(APIDi   bi)  (4.13) 
The message will be sent out to the neighbor with the current value for APIDi. Thus, 
we will rewrite Mij as it appears in (4.14): 
Mij = Padding || OHPIDij || Ekij (APIDi  || PIDi || Ekibs (Di)) (4.14) 
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(a) SNj receives a message from SNi. 
 
(b) SNj forwards the message to a neighbor SNr. 
 
(c) BS receives the message and processes it. 
Figure 4.1: The sequence of a message transmission from SNi to the BS.  
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Padding is added to make sure all the one-hop messages have the same size to 
prevent size correlation attacks. When SNj receives the message, it will reformat the 
message as in expression (4.15) and then send it to SNr: 
Mjr = APIDi  || OHPIDjr || Ejr (APIDj  || PIDi || Ekibs (Di))  (4.15) 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Using APIDi for acknowledgement with no errors. 
 
The transmission of Mjr should be heard by all the neighbors including both SNi 
and SNr. If SNi hears the message and reads (APIDi), the SNi knows that Mij was received 
correctly by SNj. Only at this time SNi updates the value of OHPIDij. PIDi will get 
updated, as well, since SNi is the source of the message. Here are two scenarios: 
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Scenario 1: The packet sent by SNi is lost or got corrupted. In this case, SNj 
considers nothing happened, so it will not forward any message onward. Meanwhile, SNi 
will wait for () time to expire. It will send the message again with updated APIDi. Once 
the message gets acknowledged according to the procedure explained earlier, then PIDi, 
OHPIDi and APIDi will get updated. If it is intermediary SN, only OHPIDi and APIDi gets 
updated as exhibited in Figure 4.3. 
Scenario 2: The packet is received correctly by SNj, the new packet Mjr is sent 
out which contains the acknowledgement (APIDi), and SNj updated the value of OHPIDij. 
However, SNi does not hear the forwarded message Mjr within time (). At this moment 
SNi does not know for sure if the message was delivered (resembles scenario 1), or the 
acknowledgement is lost. It has to account for the worst case. A copy of the message will 
be retransmitted to SNj with the current OHPIDi and updated APIDi. SNj can recognize the 
message because of the value of old OHPIDi. After receiving the retransmitted message, it 
now sends a direct acknowledgement to SNi as in expression (4.16).  
ACKij =  APIDi  || Padding  (4.16) 
Figure 4.4 exhibits the process. BS is treated similar to a normal SN, so it has to 
acknowledge every message it receives. After the message is delivered to the BS, and after 
the message is acknowledged, the PIDi (of the source) will get updated on the BS tables 
while it has been already updated in the sensor itself after the first acknowledgement.  
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Figure 4.3: Acknowledgement for a message with errors. 
Figure 4.4: Handling lost acknowledgement. 
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Both the SNi and the BS will be ready to exchange a new message. As long the new 
message does not reach to the BS before the old PIDi gets updated, the system will remain 
synchronized. This way, we have a possible window of one message only. We propose 
implementing a sliding window mechanism as exhibited in Figure 4.5 [7]. For each sensor, 
we can have a window of (W) slots. 
4.3.4. Transmission as a broadcaster 
Typically, the BS is required to broadcast a message for control and management 
purposes. Likewise, a sensor might need to broadcast a message to the BS or to the 
neighbors for network setup, maintenance and other management issues. The framework 
requires keeping all the messages indistinguishable throughout the network, so all the 
messages need to have the same size. Each SN is preloaded with a broadcast key (kbi) and 
assigned broadcast pseudonym (BPIDi). The broadcast message sent by SNi is formatted 
as in expression (4.17): 
Mb = Padding || BPIDi || Ekbi(Db)  (4.17) 
The broadcast message from a source SNi will be received by all the neighbors. SNi 
and the recipients will update BPIDi according to expression (4.18).   
BPIDi = H1(BPIDi  bi)  (4.18) 
Upon receiving the broadcast message (Mb), SNj decrypts the message using (kbi) 
stored in the table (Tj). It then encrypts it again using (kbj) and broadcasts (Mb) to its one-
hop neighbors set (Nj) as in expression (19): 
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Mb = BPIDi || BPIDj || Ekbj(Db)  (4.19) 
 
Figure 4.5: Sliding window for received PIDs [7]. 
When the BS receives a broadcast message, it is ultimately the destination, so 
intuitively it does not need to broadcast the message again. Our proposed framework 
assumes that the BS behaves similar to a normal sensor. To maintain this pre-course, we 
require the BS to broadcast the message again for acknowledgement purpose. Thus, we 
introduce the limited broadcast where the BS will be able to broadcast to only one hop 
(TTL=1).  
4.3.5. Limited Broadcast Messages 
A sensor inside network maze can only recognize the neighboring sensors and the 
BS. When SN broadcasts a message uplink (towards the BS), then all neighbors should 
hear it. The neighbor should broadcast the message again if and only if the message comes 
from a SN with a bigger hop-count (HC). This will conserve a lot of unnecessary traffic 
and energy dissipation. The broadcast message will contain (TTL=HC). The value will 
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keep decreasing by one until it gets to the BS. In contrast, the downlink broadcast messages 
(by the BS to the SNs) should have (TTL=0) where the intermediary sensors would 
rebroadcast the message if and only if it comes from a neighbor with a smaller (HC). A 
special case when (TTL=1) where the message will be broadcasted to one-hop neighbors 
only. FAC also may adopted a more sophisticated optimized flooding algorithms for 
wireless multi-hop network, such as CDS-based algorithms [81, 82].  
4.3.6.  Fake Broadcast Message 
The sensors need to send fake messages to prevent time correlation, rate analysis 
and statistical analysis. A fake message is technically a one-hop broadcast message. 
However, to prevent correlation, the message needs to behave similar to real messages. So, 
the message needs to be encrypted and have similar size as the real message to make it 
completely indistinguishable. Since it has to carry a dummy data, it will contain the 
residual energy () of the issuing sensor. This information will be extracted by the recipient 
neighbors and saved in the related tuple in the table (T).  The fake broadcast message sent 
by SNi is as in expression (4.20): 
Mf = Padding || FPIDi || Ekfi(i)  (4.20) 
The fake broadcast message from SNi will be received by all the neighbors. SNi 
and the recipients will then update FPIDi according to expression (4.21).   
FPIDi = H1(FPIDi  ci)  (4.21) 
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There is no need to worry about the pseudonyms synchronization since the main 
purpose of the fake messages is to show activity in idle sensors to obfuscate real messages. 
4.4. SN removal 
There are many reasons why a sensor should be removed from WSN. For instance, 
when the battery of a sensor is about to deplete, it should refrain from participation. This 
would protect against data loss and maintain the pseudonyms synchronized. In some other 
cases, WSN use IDS [83, 84] to protect against active attacks, so  once a sensor is captured, 
it must be banished from the network.  
Procedurally, if SNi opts to be removed, it will send a messages to the BS as in expression 
(4.22).  
Mij = OHPIDij || Ekij (PIDi || Ekibs (Dremove))  (4.22) 
Where (Dremove) is a command to banish the sensor. The tuple of the SNi in the BS 
tables will be disabled permanently. In addition, SNi will send a broadcast message to the 
neighbors as in (4.23): 
Mb = Padding || BPIDi || Ekbi(Dremove)  (4.23) 
Once the neighbors get the message (Dremove), they will delete the tuple related to 
SNi from the table (T) and banish the sensor. The same process could be used by the BS 
for sensor removal.  
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4.5. SN Addition 
To add a new sensor to the network, the sensor will be preloaded with the required 
parameters: IDi, ai, bi, ci, H1, kibs and kbi, and fkbi. Right after deployment, the sensor 
calculates the shared parameters with its neighbors. The BS should be trusted to run the 
process. The BS will send special key (kadd) to all the neighbors. SNi will be preloaded with 
the same key as well. SNi and the neighbors will use this special key to authenticate with 
each other. Initially, the BS sends the following message to the one-hop neighbors of the 
new sensor as in expression (4.24): 
Mb = Padding || BPIDbs || Ekb-bs(Dadd)  (4.24) 
Where (Dadd) is expressed in expression in (4.25): 
Dadd = hc || kadd (4.25) 
The initial value for hc is zero. It will be incremented every time the message is 
forwarded.  
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CHAPTER 5: DATA AUTHENTICATION AND 
INTEGRITY 
 The data is encrypted before transmission to protect against passive attacks such 
as eavesdropping. For active attacks, such as data and transaction falsification, message 
authentication is required. The two important security aspects to achieve: (i) Verify that 
the content of the message is not altered and, (ii) the source is authentic. We could achieve 
authentication by either using a message authentication code (MAC), or one way hash 
function (OWH). MAC would require the sender (SNi) and receiver (BS) to share a secret 
key. The authentication code is calculated as: MAC = F(k, D). DES or other algorithms can 
be used to generate the code. The OWH also accepts a variable size message (D) as input 
and produces a fixed sized digest MD = H(D) as output. Examples for OWH are: SHA, 
MD5, Whirlpool and HMAC. The advantage of OWH over MAC is the fact that it does not 
use encryption which is quite slow. Comes in the middle, HMAC which is a MAC derived 
from OWH such as SHA-1. It could be expressed as: MD = HMAC(K, D). 
If we opt to use HMAC as an example, the (Mij) will be rewritten as in expression (5.1): 
Mij = APIDi || OHPIDij || Ekij (APIDi  || PIDi || Ekibs (Di)) || HMACkibs (PIDi || Di) 
 (5.1) 
The key (kibs) is shared between SNi and the BS. The message could be 
authenticated with MD using OWH as in the expression below: 
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Mij = APIDi  || OHPIDij || Ekij (APIDi  || PIDi || Ekibs (Di) || H(PIDi || Ekibs (Di))) 
(5.2) 
As it is transparent from expression (5.2), we need more processing time and 
therefore more power consumption because we have encrypted a sizable packet. There is 
a tradeoff between higher security and energy conservation. The first approach is more 
appropriate. Authentication for the broadcast messages is done as in expression (5.3): 
Mb = Padding || BPIDi || Ekbi( Db) || HMACkbi( Db) )  (5.3) 
Alternatively, it can be achieved using expression (5.4): 
Mb = Padding || BPIDi || Ekbi( Db || H(kbi || Db) )  (5.4) 
The message could contain other important information such as sequence number 
(similar to the well-known HDLC and TCP protocols) and time stamp. The receiver uses 
the sequence number to verify the order of messages. Time stamp is used to check the delay 
threshold. Both checks will enhance protection against various active attacks. The message 
core data (Di) could have the following format: 
Di  =  SEQ_NO || TIME_STAMP || MSG_LGTH || SENSED_DATA (5.5) 
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CHAPTER 6: TEMPORAL AND RATE PRIVACY 
 
WSN could suffer from time correlation attacks [6, 18, 19, 28, 85] by observing the 
time between correlative packets sent and received in a certain neighborhood. The 
adversary can trace forward and backward the messages until they reach to the BS or to the 
source. Hence, hiding temporal information is crucial for both anonymity and location 
privacy. Using routing schemes to protect against time correlation attacks is found to be 
efficient to certain extent where local adversary usually has limited mobility and partial 
view of the network traffic. However, routing based schemes do not work for global 
adversary where the traffic of the whole network can be easily monitored with a full spatial 
view and the adversaries can collude together to promptly detect the origin and time 
information of the event [34, 70]. A mechanism is required to divert attention of the 
adversary when there is event-driven transmissions, especially with the presence of global 
adversary [36]. The distribution of events changes which could be a reason for the 
adversary to detect the event timing and thereafter the source of the event. The message 
distribution (both real and fake) needs to be adjusted to prevent time correlation. In some 
applications, such as monitoring and surveillance, we cannot guarantee a certain event 
distribution. The literature talk about three ways to maintain an obfuscated message 
distribution: (i) By issuing message delays, and (ii) by issuing fake messages, and (ii) by 
using both delays and fake messages. Using delays works well against local adversary but 
might not be suitable for time sensitive networks. In contrast, using fake messages is 
required to protect against multi-local and global adversary, however, it is very expensive 
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in terms of energy dissipation.  Furthermore, adversary with good statistical analysis can 
easily detect the message distribution if the scheme is not designed carefully [70].  
 
 Figure 6.1: A probabilistic distribution for fake messages [41, 70]. 
Some work in the literature clearly differentiates between two terms: the event (of 
transmission) and the interval (of transmission). If every interval has only one 
transmission, then event and interval are the same, however, this might not be the case 
when we have multiple transmissions during one interval. So, the anonymity level depends 
on the capability of the adversary to distinguish between real and fake transmissions. This 
means, given multiple transmissions by a SN, the adversary must be unable to distinguish, 
with significant confidence, between transmissions carry real data and transmissions carry 
fake data. Alomair et al. [70] suggested that transmission “indistinguishability” is not 
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enough. They claim that indistinguishability is achieved when adversary monitoring the 
network over multiple time intervals, in which some intervals contain real event 
transmissions and others do not, is unable to determine, with significant confidence, which 
of the intervals contain the real traffic.  If intervals are indistinguishable, the individual 
transmissions within the interval should also be indistinguishable. 
We should have a mechanism to quantify anonymity while it is used, in the 
literature, in different ways. However, in our work, anonymity means how to prevent the 
adversary from knowing the source of the message. In other words, the adversary could 
know that a particular sensor sent a message at one time, but it should not know that sensor 
is the source of the message. By delaying the real messages and by issuing multiple 
messages at one interval would mislead the adversary. As an example, for one transmission 
and one adversary, where the adversary can guess either the message is real or fake without 
any anonymity measurement taken, it should be 0.5 (either fake or real). Let’s presume  
donates one adversary strategy for breaching the anonymity of the system among a set of 
strategies. Let’s presume Pr is the probability that the adversary succeeds using strategy . 
The anonymity A as defined in [70] with the existence of a strategy, is presented in the 
expression below: 
A: = 1 – Pr, where    0≤Pr≤1  (6.1) 
If we presume that  represents all possible strategies for the adversary to breach 
the anonymity of the WSN, the accumulated anonymity will be as in the expression below: 
A:= min(A), where  ∈   (6.2) 
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It is very important to increase anonymity for every individual SN in the network 
especially with the presence of multi-local or global adversaries. Presence of colluding 
adversaries could cause the anonymity to drop exponentially [70].  Take Figure 6.2 as an 
example, where WSN has a moving Panda from point “a”, to “b”, to “c”, then finally to 
“d” where each location has a SN to report the Panda’s movement. If the anonymity of 
each sensor is A=0.8, then the anonymity at node “b” is A=0.82=0.64 and at point “d” is 
A=0.84=0.41. Having global adversary makes it super necessary to design a strong 
anonymity model which can resist the time correlation attack [6]. 
 
Figure 6.2: Having multiple colluding nodes will reduce system anonymity exponentially [6, 41, 70]. 
In this work, we assume the worst case for time correlation attacks which is a global 
or laptop-class adversary attacks [10]. Having an anonymity scheme to protect against the 
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global adversary will be very expensive solution in terms of energy preservation and thus 
the lifetime of the network. In the following two subsections, we propose two schemes, the 
simple global anti temporal (SGAT) and the energy controlled anti temporal (ECAT). 
6.1. Simple Global Anti Temporal scheme (SGAT) 
When an event-driven message is sent out, the adversary can trace back the message 
to the SN or forward to the BS. Sending few other transmissions in the network within the 
range of the adversary confuses it and prevents the adversary from having known path to 
follow.  
In this work, we presume the lifetime of the network () is divided into a number 
of intervals (I) and each interval time is (), where: 
 =  I . i  (6.3) 
The value of   can be predicted as a range between a minimum value (worst case) 
min and a maximum value (best case) max. It all depends on how real / fake transmissions 
are facilitated. The SNs will send either a fake or a real message during one interval. The 
message is sent at the end of each interval or it is adjusted to be sent during the interval to 
create some variable delays through the route to the BS which would confuse the adversary 
more and would prevent it from gaining useful knowledge about the network based on time 
correlation. SNi which has sensed the event or received the real data from another SNj, will 
send the real message (Mr) through a hop-by-hop path to the BS, and some other nodes will 
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send fake messages (Mf) during the same time to disrupt the adversary. There are two 
questions: 
How long the message will be held in the SN after it is sensed? Simplistically, Mr 
and Mf are sent at the end of the interval I. The time period from arrival of the data to the 
end of the period time (w) expressed in the expression below: 
w  = i - ta   where: t0 ≤ ta ≤ ts ≤ i  (6.4) 
Where: t0 is the beginning of the interval Ii, ta is the arrival time, t0  ≤  ta.    
Ideally, the message will be sent immediately after it is sensed or received which 
makes w  = 0. Theoretically, w could be a value: 0 ≤ w  ≤i as exhibited in Figure 6.3. 
How many SNs in the network will send fake message during one interval time and 
which ones? Simplistically, every SN in the network which is in the range of the adversary 
and in the range of source SN, should send a fake message while SNs that have real 
messages will send the real messages only.  
There are many technical issues regarding the determination of the optimal 
configuration for both questions mentioned earlier. For instance, it is not possible for the 
neighboring nodes to know in advance when a SN is going to sense an event. It is a 
completely unpredictable random-distribution for the events. The need to transmit fake 
messages becomes even much more crucial if we do not have busy-network. Therefore, all 
SNs with no real messages need to send fake messages during the interval Ii, in the worst 
case, or only a selected nodes according to a probabilistic protocol. Having high number 
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of fake message transmissions will reduce the lifetime of the network in favor of privacy. 
Doing the reverse will jeopardize the privacy of the sensor nodes. Sending real and fake 
messages at the end of the interval could be learned by the adversary. However, it is not 
very dangerous if the network sends enough fake messages at the same time. 
 
Figure 6.3: Delays incurred at each SN [6]. 
 
Having variable withhold time (w) is useful for privacy and for reducing the 
average network delay. The delivery time (d) presuming that the message is always sent 
at the end of the interval Ii is: 
d = w + trans + proc  (6.5) 
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Where: d is delivery time, trans is transmission time, proc is processing time. 
If we presume proc  is much smaller than trans, then d can be rewritten as the 
following: 
d = w + trans   (6.6) 
If the message needs to go through (U) hops to the BS, and if we assume that the 
transmission only happens at the end of the Interval Ii, then ts, equals to i, and the total 
delivery time (d-total) can be calculated according to the expression below [6]: 
ௗି௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ 	∑ ߬௪ೠ௎௨ୀଵ ൅ ߬௧௥௔௡௦ೠ   (6.7) 
Having ts equals to i; i.e., sending message at the end of the interval, will increase 
the delay of the delivery presuming that every trans is equal [6]. Thus, optimizing d-total is 
a function of w according to the expression : 
ௗି௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ fሺ߬௪ሻ ൌ 	∑ ߬௪ೠ௎௨ୀଵ  (6.8) 
Each SN will be informed during the setup phase about i for the lifetime of the 
network. The BS also can alter this value by broadcast when the conditions of the WSN 
changes (closed-loop control). The value of i should be calculated to achieve at least the 
minimum expected lifetime span min without jeopardizing the privacy and data integrity. 
Thus, 
high-th ≥ i ≥ low-th  (6.9) 
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Where: high-th is the highest possible value for i and, low-th is the lowest expected 
value for i. When SN does not have a real message to send before the end of the interval 
period Ii, it will send a fake message according to the procedure explained in the anonymity 
module. When SN has a real message, it will send it to one node from the neighborhood 
set (Ni).  
6.1.1. Security analysis 
The adversary sees every SN sending a message at a fixed data rate at any one time. 
It also cannot distinguish any message from the rest of the messages in the network since 
none have similar ID. If we have N nodes in the WSN, the probability that one adversary 
can locate the sending node equals to: 
௥ܲ ൌ 	 ଵே   (6.10) 
We can calculate anonymity as: 
Α ൌ 1 െ ௥ܲ  (6.11) 
6.1.2. Delivery time 
Message follows hop-by-hop path until it gets to the BS as exhibited in Figure 6.4.  
In this scheme, the message waits until the end of the interval. The delay will be calculated 
according to the expression below [6]:  
ௗି௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ ߬௪బ ൅ ሺHC െ 1ሻ ∗ ߱௜ ൅ ߬௧௥௔௡௦ೠ  (6.12) 
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It axiomatic that most delay accumulates from holding the message until the end of 
the interval periods.  
 
Figure 6.4: Total delay required to send a message from a source to the BS through (U) hopes [6] 
6.1.3. Energy cost 
We presume in this scheme that every node would send one message at the end of 
each interval. The message could be either real or fake. If we have (N) nodes in the WSN, 
then we expect (N) messages during each interval Ii. The energy spent for transmission is 
almost constant since we have fixed size messages. However, we can evaluate how 
expensive it would be to use fake messages for privacy enhancement. If we have (Q) 
percent of the nodes send real messages at each interval, then we are wasting (1-Q) percent 
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of the energy and of the bandwidth. We can adjust the amount of energy consumed by 
increasing the interval period i. However, increasing i, would increase the delays. 
If a SN  receives multiple messages in one interval, then it will queue the messages 
for transmission. Because the SN needs to wait till the end of the interval, it could arrange 
the messages in a queue and send them randomly at the end of interval. This should also 
increase the privacy and security of the data. It could also select a different forward node 
for each message. In conclusion, SGAT is energy-expensive due to sending fake/real 
messages by every node per each interval of time. However, SGAT provides the maximum 
message entropy. Figure 6.5 exhibits the network transmissions for two consecutive 
intervals. 
6.2. Energy Controlled Anti Temporal scheme (ECAT) 
There are three major drawbacks in SGAT: (i) Having fixed interval time i while 
it is possible to adjust the value for a better traffic and energy control, (ii) not considering 
the residual energy as a metric for selecting the forward hop, (iii) high rate of traffic due to 
fake messages. 
6.2.1. Changing i from fixed to variable 
Having a fixed interval time i could be a glitch for network performance. If i is 
set to be a large value, then the delay will be high which could be a serious problem in 
some time sensitive applications. If i is set to be a small value, then a huge amount of 
fake messages will be sent at the end of each interval which will reduce the lifetime of SNs 
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and accordingly the lifetime of the WSN. We propose that we have variable i as presented 
in [10]. Every node will be calculating its i using a pseudo-random number generator 
(PRNG). We suggest a uniform distribution algorithm such as multiplicative congruential 
algorithm [86, 87], which is the basis for many of the random number generators in use 
today. Lehmer’s generators [88] involve three integer parameters, r, s, and m, and an initial 
value, x0, called the seed. A sequence is generated by the following modified formula: 
Xk+1 = b*((r.Xk + s) mod m + f)  (6.13) 
The result of the modified PRNG will be a sequence of integer values between (b×f) 
and (b×(m+f-1)). Each SN needs to be preloaded with the seed x0, r, s, m, b and f values. 
The seed range is 0 to (m-1) and it is uniformly assigned to the sensor nodes. If b = 2, f = 
1 and m = 4 then sequence of four intervals will be: i ∈ [2,4,6,8] time-units as exhibited 
in Figure 6.6. We could have up to (m!) different sequences which are uniformly 
distributed on the SNs. For instance, we can have (24) different sequences for our example 
and if we have (48) nodes in the network, so each sequence should be provided to two 
nodes only. 
Each node will be dynamically assigned an interval value which needs to change 
after each transmission. Taking the example above, the first ଵ௠ th (more or less) of the 
sensors will send data after 2 time-units. Then, the second ଵ௠ th will transmit after 4 time-
units, and so on. At any point of time, the adversary will be faced by enough transmissions 
in the network that it could divert its attention far away from the SNs sending real data. By 
having (m) interval values where each SN will be generating one i using the PRNG, we 
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have reduced the average interval time from max to ave. That is explained in the inequality 
below: 
.  
(a) Sensors sense events and send real messages while the rest send fake messages. 
 
(b): Sensors send or forward real messages will not send fake messages. The more the network 
gets busy the less fake messages are transmitted. 
Figure 6.5: Anonymity with fake messages. 
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௠௔௫ ൐ ௔௩௘ ൌ భ்ା⋯ା ೘்௠ ൐ ௠௜௡   (6.14) 
Considering the earlier example, we have max =8, min=2 and ave=5. That is: we 
have reduced the delay interval by 37.5%. If m=8, then delay reduced by 44%. The 
transmission of real and fake messages is exhibited in Figure 6.7. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: The generation of the sequence of intervals assigned for each sensor.  
 
6.2.2. Reducing fake messages and delay for real messages 
We have created a mechanism for dynamic interval allocation. Let us call  the big 
interval which has subintervals i. It still makes sense to send fake messages at the end of 
each interval. However, having the real message wait until the end of the interval time, as 
exhibited in Figure 6.8, is not commendable because it increases the delay at each node. 
Let us presume the current subinterval i is the maximum, which is 8 time-units according 
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to the example discussed earlier. Let us presume that the message was sensed at 2 time-
units and it is ready to be sent at 4 time-units. Following the SGAT rules, it still needs to 
wait for another 4 time-units to be sent out!  However, we know for sure that many other 
nodes have different i  subinterval values. Thus, during the time subintervals 2, 4, 6, and 
8 there is enough traffic in the network. We propose that when the data is ready, the SNi 
should send the data during the next subinterval slot within the current interval i. 
Consequently, if we are at interval max=8 which has four subintervals at (2, 4, 6, and 8), 
and for our example, at 6 time-units the data can be sent out. This way, we save about 2 
time-units delay while we can guarantee that the adversary will not be able to infer the 
source of transmission because we have enough traffic distributed in the network.  
 
 Figure 6.7: SN is assigned a sequence of intervals which repeat until sensor lifetime ends.  
If we select higher values for , then we can further reduce the number of fake messages 
transmitting at one subinterval, however, we are increasing the average delay as well. 
Selecting a value for  could be a tool to adjust security versus energy conservation. We 
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have improved the fake message efficacy (FME) [6, 7] which could be calculate as in 
below: 
ܨܯܧ ൌ ∑
	
ೄ಺೔	ି௠
೔స೘೔సభ
∑ 	ೄ಺೔
೔స೘೔సభ
  (6.15) 
Where   is the big interval value, (SIi) the subinterval value, (m) the total number of 
subintervals.  
For example, if SN assigned a sequence ߱௜	 ∈ [4,6,2,8], fake messages could be sent at the 
following subintervals [4,10,12,20,24,30,32 . . . . .], and the real messages could be sent at 
the following sub intervals [2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, . . . .]. By substituting i = 8, SIi = 2 and m=4, 
FME will be 60%. Figure 6.7 exhibits the transmission of fake and real messages for two 
consecutive subintervals. 
6.2.3. Energy conservation  
When a node senses data or receives data that needs to be forwarded to the BS, it 
has to select the next one-hop node from the neighborhood set Ni. During the setup phase, 
each SNi has information about the hop-distance for each of the neighbors stored in its table 
Ti. Typically, there are three sets: one set where the hop-distance is less than its own (uplink 
set), a set where the hop-distance equals to itself (equal-link set) and a set where the hop-
distance is larger than itself (downlink set). Choosing a node randomly or by round-robin 
from the uplink set will be ideal in terms of delays since it will give the shortest path to the 
BS. However, that will cause the nodes in this set to consume more energy compared to 
the other two sets of the neighbors. After each transmission, the SN consumes some energy. 
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Figure 6.8: Any node assigned subinterval ߱௜	 ൌ 2 will send a fake message if it does not have a real 
message to report. 
 
 
Figure 6.9: How to choose the forwarding node according to the energy levels of the neighbors.  
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The residual energy for SNi will be calculated as below: 
Δ௥௘௦௜ௗ௨௔௟ ൌ ୼೎ೠೝೝ೐೙೟୼೔೙೔೟೔ೌ೗   (6.16) 
Each node will calculate its residual energy and share it with its one-hop neighbors. 
When the node sends fake messages, it will send its residual energy with it. The neighbor 
SNj will store the value in its Tj for each of its neighboring nodes. This way, any sensor 
node will have some information about the residual energy level for its immediate 
neighbors. Figure 6.9 exhibits the mechanism for selecting the forward node. 
6.2.4. Handling rate attack 
One issue that WSN with one sink could suffer from is having higher transmission 
rate next to the BS where messages ultimately need to reach out to the BS as the final 
destination. In contrast, periphery sensors far from the BS could have light transmission 
rates. Figure 6.10 exhibits the issue. This could jeopardize the location privacy of the BS. 
One solution is to have multiple sinks distributed in the network. This contradicts with the 
pre assumptions we set for our framework so we will not address this solution in this work. 
The framework needs to maintain similar average rate among all the sensors. This could 
be achieved by increasing the number of fake messages transmitted by less busy nodes 
which means increasing the bandwidth usage and the power consumption. We need also to 
reduce the fake messages sent by busy nodes or delay the real messages to maintain similar 
rates. The latter is achieved automatically since the sensors do not send fake messages 
when they have real messages. However, this could be better tuned for average busy nodes 
as well. Having balanced rate in the WSN could help to maintain balanced average lifetime 
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for the nodes in the network. Presuming that all the nodes are heterogeneous in terms of 
energy would mean that busy nodes would be depleted sooner which could create an empty 
coverage area or a buffer zone between the sink and the peripheral SNs. This makes it a 
double fold problem. The first approach is to select a suitable location for the BS in the 
network map. Most of the literature shows a side location for the BS. It is maybe due to the 
fact that it is more suitable for the applications in hand where the BS is connected to the 
backbone network in a reachable area and sensors are unattended in out of reach areas. 
Figure 6.11 exhibits that the coverage area of a central BS is much better than a side BS. 
The density of nodes closer to the BS should be higher. The range of transmission for 
sensors in higher density areas may need adjustment to control energy dissipation. We 
could have multiple density areas around the BS where the density is reduced as it gets 
distant from the BS.  
Figure 6.11 exhibits only two density areas for simplicity. If the storage of the 
sensor is not big enough which is unrealistic case with increasing storage technology in the 
sensors, the sensor does not need to include all the neighbors in the tables. The network 
will be divided into two areas, near (An) and far (Af). The framework will set average 
transmission rate (ATR) thresholds, Rmax and Rmin. Sensors in An will be loaded with 
Rmax where the sensors need to queue messages to maintain the threshold. In reverse, 
sensors in Af will be loaded with Rmin to maintain the lower threshold by sending more 
fake messages as needed. The sensor will calculate its average transmission rate over a 
period of time Tatr, which is preset by the framework. 
 
 
72
 
Figure 6.10: Higher transmission rate next to the BS [6]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11: To balance the higher data rate nearby the sink, we acquire a higher density sensor 
distribution. 
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CHAPTER 7: ANONYMITY AND SECURITY 
ANALYSIS 
We need to analyze FAC for both passive and active adversary attacks. The 
adversary (ADV) model has a global view of the network. ADV could target the source, 
intermediary and BS nodes. Usually, ADV starts by monitoring transmission somewhere 
in the network and then attempts to acquire sources (downlink direction) or BS (uplink 
direction). Passive attack is ordinarily the base for active attack. Once ADV determines the 
identity and location of a source or the BS, it consequently can launch various active attacks 
against certain nodes or disrupt the operation of the entire WSN. The main strength of 
passive ADV is the fact that neither SNs nor the BS will know about their existence. 
Nonetheless, active attacks can be detected if the framework instruments a reasonable IDS. 
Any comprehensive solution for location privacy should protect against anonymity attacks, 
temporal attacks and rate discovery attacks. We believe that routing privacy is useful only 
against local advisory and once the WSN faced with a global or a multi-local adversary, 
rounding privacy is not crucial. Thus, we have chosen short-path routing technique for this 
work. Any other routing protocols should be utilized to reduce delays and energy 
consumption. 
7.1. Security against passive attacks 
SNs use disposable pseudonyms to identify each other instead of using real IDs. No 
real ID stored in the sensor and no pseudonym is used more than once.  Data is encrypted 
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all the way from the source to the BS using shared pair-wise keys. For eavesdropping and 
content analysis, ADV can intercept messages without being able to read them because 
data is encrypted all the way to the BS. The only information ADV can get from the 
captured messages is the pseudonyms: OHPID, BPID or FPID which are all temporary IDs 
and have no use except to calculate a new set of pseudonyms. Fortunately, the ADV cannot 
get from the captured messages, important parameters aij,bi or ci which are all required to 
calculated new pseudonyms. Source PIDs are all encrypted during transmission. For hop-
by-hop trace, ADV can track a stream of messages from one node to another by 
overhearing the messages. The ADV will be challenged with many real and fake 
transmissions throughout the WSN. Furthermore, each node will retransmit the messages 
through different routes. For size-correlation, ADV will be able to understand relationship 
between incoming and outgoing messages by analyzing sizes of the messages. This attack 
does not work for our framework since all the messages have commensurate size. For 
identity correlation, ADV cannot relate overheard identities to their nodes. It is not possible 
since SNs use different pseudonyms every time a message is transmitted. For rate 
monitoring, ADV tries to collect some statistical information about transmission rates. For 
instance, WSN will have a higher transmission rate nearby the sink. This is handled by 
issuing fake messages to maintain a similar transmission rate. For angle-of-arrival (AoA), 
ADV uses special hardware to determine the signal direction. The framework did not 
account for specific countermeasure, however, it becomes a more serious issue with mobile 
SNs. Furthermore, AoA would not perform well in our framework because of the uniform 
message distribution by using real and fake messages. For received-signal-strength (RSS), 
ADV uses special hardware to measure signal strength to calculate distance to the source. 
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This is not an issue for our framework since every transmitter has fixed transmission power 
and SNs are immobile.  
7.2. Security against active attacks 
In principle, we assume ADV knows encryption protocols used by the framework, 
however, the framework needs to hide encryption keys and IDs. Active attacks can be 
categorized into: soft and hard. For soft-active attacks, ADV tries to compromise SNs to 
get some information related to security of the sensors such as keys and IDs. Consequently, 
it will monitor all messages traversing through the compromised nodes to discover the 
source and the BS locations. ADV hides its presence by acting passively (soft) but once it 
captures privacy information, it reports the information to an external executer to do further 
damages (such as killing the Panda in the Panda game). For that, it is harder for the IDS to 
detect the attack. In hard-active attacks, ADV captures SNs and invasively forge messages, 
sent replay messages etc. Moreover, ADV could load powerful devices with the captured 
credentials to launch more catastrophic attacks. Hard-active attacks could be detected by 
IDS, however, it could depend very much on the sophistication of the IDS used. With that, 
it remains very challenging to countermeasure hard-active attacks. In the following two 
subsections, we will analyze the security of our framework against active attacks. 
7.2.1. Soft-active attacks 
If ADV physically compromises SNi, then it captures two sets of information: 
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(i) Information related to the node itself: the current PID, the parameters used to 
calculate the pseudonyms, the hash functions, the keys and other information 
as listed in Table (2). 
(ii) Information related to the neighbors as listed in Table (3).  
The ADV would have all it needs to issue new valid pseudonyms and to send 
messages out to neighbors. Let’s look closely at few scenarios. 
Scenario 1: If ADV physically compromises SNi, and if SNj and SNr ∈ Ni, so SNi 
knows some information about both SNj and SNr. However, it cannot calculate important 
information such as ajr which is required for one-hop communication between SNj and 
SNr [68], because SNi would need IDj and IDr which are both deleted permanently at the 
end of the setup phase. If SNi hears a message, it cannot determine, with high confidence, 
the sender among neighbors while communicating with each other. If SNi receives message 
from sources ∉ Ni, then it would not be able to determine the source. 
Scenario 2: If ADV physically compromises multiple SNs, let’s call it set Ncs, and 
collects number of messages, let’s call it set Ncm. Then, the number of compromised PIDs 
equal to Ncm since each message has unique PID. If the source SNi ∉ Ncs, then ADV cannot 
know the source node [7, 89]. 
Scenario 3: If the message sent by source SNi as in scenario 2 passes thought SNj 
∈ Ncs or even through multiple compromised nodes, it will not be able to correlate the 
captured PIDi with SNi.  
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Scenario 4: If a message sent by source SNi and ∀ SN ∈ Ni is also ∈ Ncs (all 
neighbors are compromised), then ADV will be able to know that SNi is the source. It is 
unrealistic situation to have many compromised nodes in one area. However, this proves 
that single or few compromised nodes cannot locate the identity of the source. In addition, 
a compromised node does not actually need to locate the sources within its range since it 
can detect the objects of interest (Panda) knowing that the ultimate goal of the adversary is 
to capture the object not the sensor reporting the object.  
In summary, while we cannot prevent physical capturing of sensors, we need to 
make sure capturing sensors do not have destructive effects on other sensors.  It is clear 
that our anonymity model protects against the avalanche or the domino effect behavior 
once one or few sensors are physically captured. 
7.2.2. Hard-active attacks 
If ADV physically compromises SNi then it can launch denial of service attacks 
(DoS), which is an effort to temporarily or indefinitely suspend transmission in the 
network. It consumes the resources such as bandwidth, memory, storage, and processor 
time. When ADV compromises SNs, it would be able to send massive valid messages to 
consume system resources. The ADV will be able also to launch replay attacks where ADV 
gets credentials of the some sensors and attempts to mimic the sensors to send messages to 
other neighbors. The other attacks such as, forging attack, packet alternation, packet 
dropping and packet injection are all only possible to physically captured nodes. However, 
it cannot propagate easily behind neighbors. Nothing could be worse than having 
physically captured nodes where ADV has full control over the sensors. Good IDS can 
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detect such attacks and respond by removing the compromised nodes immediately. The 
most danger tactic of hard-active attacks is to prevent the real messages from following 
normal paths to the BS and force the messages to traverse through certain routes. Our main 
contribution to handle this attack is to put in place a seamless and efficient protocol to add 
and remove SNs while WSN in action. 
7.3. Sink security 
ADV can learn that a sensor has received a message in two ways: (i) When the 
sensor retransmits the message, which was tracked beforehand to another sensor, (ii) the 
ADV is able to make a correlation between the captured ID and the physical recipient 
sensor. The adversary cannot locate the BS location by compromising only one 
neighboring sensor because each transmission uses a different pseudonym. It actually will 
need to compromise multiple colluding sensors along the path to the BS or many neighbors 
of the BS. While we cannot prevent having many physically fallen sensors, our 
framework’s goal is to delay the capturing of the BS provided that there are many colluding 
captured sensors in the WSN. A very interesting scenario is exhibited in Figure 7.1. 
Let us presume SNr ∈ Ncs. It issues a message with Dbomb such that: APIDr  || 
OHPIDru || Eru (APIDr  || PIDr || Ekrbs (Dbomb)). IF ADV compromise multiple nodes 
along the path to the BS where each sensor decrypts the data to read this signature at every 
hop: (PIDr || Ekrbs (Dbomb). Providing the colluding sensors, in the path to the BS, read 
similar signature while it knows by design that every message should be directed uplink to 
the BS, the ADV could follow through to the BS. Having multiple compromised paths 
(with compromised sensors) reading the same pattern will give adversary more clues. 
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Compromised nodes can even collude to force the real messages to route through fixed 
suspected areas in effort to focus the capturing process which becomes a function of: (i) 
the size of the network, (ii) The traffic density, (iii) the number of compromised nodes. To 
solve this issue, we have to wipe out the signature before each transmission. Thus, every 
message will be forwarded to the next hop as below: 
Mux = APIDu  || OHPIDux || Eux (APIDu  || PIDr || PIDu || Ekubs (Ekrbs (Di))) 
 (7.1) 
We have added a multiple levels of encryption which will be done at every hop 
using the shared key between the hop and the BS.  In addition, PID of the hop will be added 
in sequence so the BS can do the decryption in sequence. This solution increases the size 
of the message proportionally to the number of hops. We suggest to have the onion 
encryption done for a distance of few hops, Oh. So, if Oh = 2, then we have only two extra 
encryptions. In addition, we need to account for Oh  PID’s added to the message. 
  
Figure 7.1: Hard-active Attack tries to get the BS by inserting a signature in the transmitted 
message. 
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We have implemented a WSN of 100 SNs uniformly distributed over 30 x 30 area 
where the average distance between the SNs 3.7 as in Figure 6.5. A random compromised 
sensors were interested in the network. We have simulated for Oh equals to 1, 2 and 3. The 
adversary succeeds when it knows all the nodes forming the curve around the BS in 1, 2 
and 3 hops way, consecutively. Figure 7.2 exhibits the average number of transmissions 
required before the adversary can succeed. It is clear that with higher value for Oh, the 
network will be able to send more messages before the BS is compromised. Having a higher 
number of compromised nodes in the WSN will make it faster to capture the BS, as well. 
7.4. Link anonymity 
Link anonymity is to prevent the ADV from knowing the relationship between the 
sender and the receiver. If a message leaves a sender and leaves again the recipient as it is, 
the ADV would know the relationship between the two nodes. This is secured in our 
framework since every message is completely changed after each retransmission including 
the IDs. In addition, it maintains fixed size. Applying different delays and different next-
hop direction should also increase the privacy of the link. Furthermore, the adversary 
cannot know if the link carries real or fake data. 
7.5. Timing privacy  
By using fake messages at variable interval times and message delays, it becomes 
super hard for the ADV to correlated messages being transmitted over the network as 
exhibited in Figure 6.5. 
 
 
 
81
7.6. Routing Privacy 
Although short-path routing is used in this framework, choosing the next hop is 
done according to certain probabilistic algorithm which accounts for the residual energy 
of the sensors and the usage frequency to increase the route privacy, as exhibited in 
Figure 6.9. ADV cannot relate routes to nodes due to the triple anonymity. Even if two 
messages for one sensor follow the exact same route, ADV will see them as if they are two 
different routes since each hop along the route carries messages with different PIDs.  
 
Figure 7.2: Protecting the BS by having onion encryption.  
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7.7. Data Privacy 
All the data is encrypted before transmission and encrypted again at every hop 
along the route to the BS. Data will be authenticated by a message digest. The only time 
data is not protected when the sensors are physically compromised. The compromised 
nodes are able to inject data in the network. If ADV uses the compromised nodes actively, 
a good IDS can detect the falsified data. The framework provides a secure facility to 
remove compromised sensors and to add valid sensors, if needed, to the WSN. 
7.8. SLP and BLP 
SLP and BLP are achieved at first by having the triple anonymity (source, BS, link) 
which was argued earlier. ADV cannot infer any information from the intercepted 
messages. Passive attacks will not endanger the location privacy. However, strong active 
attacks could hinder the location privacy without having good IDS. Secondly, we have 
provided a solution for temporal privacy using ECAT. Thirdly, we have provided a solution 
for rate attacks. The three security measures will work hand in hand to provide location 
privacy. 
7.9. Entropy 
For the best case for anonymity, the adversary sees every sensor node sending a 
message at a fixed data rate at any one time. It also cannot distinguish any message from 
the rest of the messages in the network due to the implementation of ID anonymity solution. 
If we have N nodes in the WSN, the probability that one adversary can locate the sending 
node or the BS equals to: 
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௜ܲ ൌ 	 ଵே  (7.2) 
One of the methods to quantify for the degree of anonymity is calculating the 
rational entropy as expressed below: 
ENሺXሻ ൌ െ∑ ሾ ௜ܲே௜ୀଵ ൈ	 logଶ ௜ܲሿ (7.3) 
 
The maximum entropy is when the adversary believes every sensor node has the 
same probability to be the transmitter (uniform distribution): 
EN୫ୟ୶ ൌ െ∑ ሾଵ୒୒୧ୀଵ ൈ	 logଶ
ଵ
୒ሿ ൌ logଶ N (7.4) 
Where∑ ௜ܲே௜ୀଵ ൌ 1, ௜ܲ is the probability that the sensor node is the transmitting 
node.  To calculate the degree of anonymity (A): 
A ൌ 1 െ	୉୒ౣ౗౮ି୉୒ሺଡ଼ሻ୉୒ౣ౗౮ ൌ
୉୒ሺଡ଼ሻ
୉୒ౣ౗౮ (7.5) 
If all the nodes would send messages at every interval then the anonymity: 
A ൌ ୉୒ሺଡ଼ሻ୉୒ౣ౗౮ ൌ
୪୭୥మ ୒
୪୭୥మ ୒ ൌ 1 (7.6) 
However, it is not realistic to have transmissions by all N in one time. If we presume 
the minimum number of transmissions per one interval (Nmin) and the average 
transmissions per one interval (Nr), then anonymity ranges: 
A ൌ ୪୭୥మ ୒ౣ౟౤୪୭୥మ ୒ ൏
୪୭୥మ ୒౨
୪୭୥మ ୒ ൏ 1 (7.7) 
With the presence of global adversary the anonymity will range 0 ൐ ܣ ൒ 1 
depending on the number of node transmitting (Nt) at one interval time as exhibited in 
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Figure 7.3. However, local adversary can detect transmission within its range, let’s say 50 
nodes density. If the transmissions within the adversary range is more than 50 
transmissions, then it would not contribute to the anonymity against that particular 
adversary. The fake messages transmission could be reduced to have all the transmissions 
(real and fake) equals to 50.  
 
Figure 7.3: Degree of anonymity (A). 
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CHAPTER 8: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the FAC framework, including 
delays, energy dissipation, data rate privacy, storage, processing, computational, and 
communication costs.  
8.1. Delay: 
In SGAT, sensors transmit/forward the data at the end of the interval, which would 
cause a huge delay considering the volume of messages that each sensor needs to transmit 
during the network real-time operation. In addition, the messages traverse through multiple 
hops until it gets to the BS, which makes the accumulated delays significant. The other 
alternative scheme is having the sensors select one of the following subintervals () 
randomly to forward the message. This also will cause some unnecessary delays although 
it could help in hiding the temporal behavior of the sensors. ECAT scheme divides ሺሻ 
into subintervals (), so the transmission will happen at the first available subinterval when 
the message is ready. We have simulated a smaller network to the one descripted in Section 
8.3 for the transmission delays. It includes 48 SNs only with  distribution as presented in 
Figure 6.5. We have three simulations using SGAT, ECAT, and random delays. Figure 8.1 
shows that delay per one-transmission increases throughout the network as the number of 
transmitted messages increases which could cause unjustifiable delays especially in the 
real time applications. Figure 8.2 also shows the average delays for the three schemes. It 
shows that using ECAT has improved delays by 64% compared to SGAT. The total delay 
 
 
86
for one message from a source to a destination (BS) is calculated according to expression 
Equation (37). It is a function of the distance from the BS (hc) which we technically have 
no control over after sensors deployment. In addition, it is a function of the chosen (ሻ and 
() values for the system. The larger the (), the more delays accumulated. We have 
simulated the same network using ECAT for the total delay as exhibited in Figure 8.3. It 
shows that the delay rises as the hc increases and as the size of the intervals widens. We 
conclude of these simulations that the performance of ECAT is better than SGAT while it 
continues to provide a good temporal privacy. Using a fixed delay will reduces the delays 
slightly but it provides a very week temporal privacy. 
  
Figure 8.1 : Total accumulated delay per one node. 
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Figure 8.2: Average accumulated delay per one node.
 
Figure 8.3: The accumulated delay is a function of the hop count (hc) and the size of . 
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8.2. Energy cost 
In our work, we will assume a simple energy dissipation model [5-7, 90]. The radio 
dissipates Ԑ nJ/bit for both transmission and reception by the sensors circuitry. In addition, 
it consumes ԑ nJ/bit/m2 for the transmitter amplifier to achieve an acceptable signal to noise 
ratio. Therefore, to transmit k bits for r distance, the total transmission energy dissipation 
will be: 
E୲ ൌ k ∗ 	Ԑ ൅ k ∗ 	rଶ ∗ ε			  (8.1) 
In addition, the receiver would consume for reception of k-bit message: 
E୰ ൌ k ∗ 	Ԑ			 (8.2) 
SGAT assumes that every node would send one message at the end of each interval 
where the message could be either real or fake. If we have N nodes in the network, then we 
expect N messages during each interval. The energy spent for transmission or reception is 
similar per one message because we have unified-size messages to prevent size correlation 
attacks by the adversary. If we have p percent of the nodes issue or forward real data at 
each interval, then 1-p percent of the energy and the bandwidth is wasted on fake messages. 
We can adjust the amount of energy consumed by increasing the interval period (). 
However, increasing (), would increase the delay. The consumption of transmitting fake 
messages is a double fold since the transmitter will consume E୲ for every message and all 
the neighbors (Ni) will consumeሺ ௜ܰ ∗ ܧ௥). When the transmission range increases, Ni 
increases. The total energy consumed in the network to send real and fake messages in one 
interval [90]: 
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Eୖ ൌ ሺNሻሺk ∗ 	Ԑ ൅ k ∗ 	rଶ ∗ εሻ ൅ ሺN ∗ ௜ܰሻሺk ∗ 	Ԑሻ			 (8.3) 
ECAT has improved the energy dissipation by reducing the amount of fake 
messages transmitted while maintaining the required temporal security. The number of 
total messages transmitted per interval has reduced from 100% to a certain percentage (p). 
We have simulated the WSN in Figure 6.8 presented in section 8.2 to calculate the energy 
dissipation. Figure 8.4 exhibits the total energy dissipation per one message considering 
the transmitter, the recipients and the range of transmission. The size of the messages is 
8,000 bits, Ԑ is 50 nJ/bit and ԑ is 100 pJ/bit/m2. The simulation shows that the energy 
dissipation due to the increase of sensor range is marginal compared to the increase in 
energy dissipation due to the increase of neighbors (Ni). However, increasing the range 
could increase Ni if the WSN has uniform sensor distribution. The technology has changed 
over years and the consumption by the sensor circuit for sending and receiving is improving 
[91]. We have also simulated the network to see how the transmission of fake messages 
has improved using ECAT. Figure 8.5 exhibits the simulation of 40 subintervals (). The 
graph shows the maximum possible fake message at each subinterval (). For instance, the 
total fake messages during =10 is 16 messages while during =32 is 20 messages. The 
mean of fake transmissions is 19.5 (compared to 48 messages in SGAT). The average  fake 
messages for the whole simulated period is 19.5 messages which shows about 59% 
reduction of possible fake messages comparted to SGAT. The number of fake message will 
be reduced further as the network gets busy transmitting real messages since a sensor node 
don’t send a fake message at a subinterval where it has a real message to convey. We have 
simulated the same network with 70% probability of event occurrence. Figure 8.6 shows 
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that the average fake messages has reduced to 5.85 messages, which is almost 88% 
reduction from SGAT. This also will reduce the energy consumption significantly. 
 
Figure 8.4: The energy dissipation increases as the number of neighbors and the sensor transmission range 
increases.  
 
Figure 8.5: A simulation for the maximum possible fake messages per subinterval using ECAT.  
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The most expensive operation for energy consumption is transmission of bits from 
one node to another. We use two stages for air communication in our framework, (i) In the 
setup phase and, (ii) in the communication phase. The data transmission during setup phase 
is minimal. During communication phase, data will be forwarded hop-by-hop to the BS. 
Every packet is equally sized to prevent time and size correlation. We have introduced a 
probabilistic fake message transmission scheme which none of the other protocols adopted. 
Real messages are sent at the end of each subinterval time to prevent delays.  
The cost per message at one interval time is: 
Average	Message	Cost ൌ 	 ୖାሺ୒ିୖሻ୔౨ା୅ୖ   (8.4) 
Where R is the total number of SNs sending real messages at one subinterval time, 
Pr the probability of sending fake message by SNs, and A is the average number of 
acknowledgements in one interval. None of the other schemes addressed the issue of rate 
analysis attacks which is one of the easiest attacks any adversary can use. Using fake 
messages is an expensive solution. However, we have designed FAC to be adaptive to the 
network traffic situation by using a closed-loop system. The sink can always increase or 
decrease the amount of fake messages used according to the reports it is getting about the 
system security. The threshold values of Rmin and Rmax are also adjustable according to the 
network situation. 
8.3. Transmission Rate Privacy 
To handle this issue, we have adopted two threshold values: Rmin and Rmax where 
the sensor needs to keep its message transmission rate between these two values. The 
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sensor needs to send real message at the end of subinterval time slot. If it does not have a 
real message, then it needs to send a fake message only if that time slot is scheduled to 
send a fake message according to ECAT protocol, otherwise no transmission will happen 
and the slot remains idle. Ideally, the sensor has a real message at the subinterval so it does 
not need to waste a slot by sending a fake message. 
 
Figure 8.6: The average fake messages in a busy network with 70% of the slots occupied by real messages.  
The sensor can use this facility to control the threshold data rate. For instance, if 
the rate is high (such as in areas nearby the BS), it can replace fake messages with real 
messages which is a double fold beneficial. If all the fake messages are already replaced 
and still there is real messages above the threshold, then the sensor is required to queue the 
messages and delay the transmission to maintain same average message rate between Rmin 
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and Rmax. In contrast, if the message rate is low (as in the periphery sensors), then the sensor 
can transmit more fake messages during idle slots. We have simulated the network in 
Figure 6.5 and assigned the Rmin to be thirteen messages for two consecutive ሺሻ intervals 
(a total of 20 subintervals). We have assigned the Rmax to be 13 messages during this period, 
which is 7 less than the total number of subintervals. That means we allowe up to 13 real 
and fake messages during these two consecutive ሺሻ intervals.  Figure 8.7 exhibits the 
output of the simulation for four different individual transmissions. For instance, the first 
transmission shows, 14 real messages (blue bar), 2 fake messages (light blue bar), and 4 
idle slots (green bar). The total real and fake messages is 16 (orange bar) which is above 
the assigned threshold, thirteen, by three messages, which is expressed by the brown bar.  
 
Figure 8.7: The simulation shows the total real messages, fake messages and idle slots.  
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The SN will cancel three fake messages out of the four. In some worse cases, the 
sensors would need to queue the messages for next slots. For instance, if there is 15 real 
messages during this time, the system send only 13 messages and queue 2 messages for the 
next period. Ultimately, the overall message rate during Tatr will be within the assigned 
thresholds.  
We have simulated this approach extensively for (500), (1,000), (1,500) and (2,000) 
transmissions as exhibited in Figure 8.8. The first, third and fifth bar sets show the total 
amount of fake messages needed to be replaced with real messages to maintain Rmin for the 
thresholds of th=10, th=11 and th=12 consecutively. For instance, a threshold of 10 means 
that the maximum number of messages transmitted should be 10 (out of 20 in our 
simulation). The second, fourth and sixth bar sets also show the number of messages which 
needed to be queued for the three consecutive threshold values. So, if we have real 
messages above the number of scheduled fake messages, then we have to queue the 
messages for the next period of Tatr . Overall, this simulation exhibits a great preference 
since we always would like to reduce the amount of fake messages and keep the bandwidth 
busy with real messages whenever it is possible. In addition, the simulation exhibits very 
small messages need to be queued (delayed). It shows as we increase the threshold value 
the less fake messages replacement or delays is required. In summation, reducing the fake 
messages and keeping the delayed message minimal is the goal which ECAT clearly 
achieves.  
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Figure 8.8: Simulation for busy network with different Rmin threshold values th=10, 11 and 12.  
8.4.  Storage Evaluation 
There are two sets of information stored in a SNi: (i) information related to the 
sensor itself such as random numbers: (ai, bi, ci), pseudonyms: (PIDi, BPIDi, FPIDi, APIDi), 
keys: (kibs, bki, fbki), (ii) information related to neighbors which include, random 
numbers: (aij, bj, cj), pseudonyms: (OHPIDij, BPIDj, FPIDj), keys: (kij), Misc: (linkij, 
j). 
If we presume that the keys, the random numbers, the pseudonyms and the hash 
functions are all n bits long in average, and the required bits for miscellaneous data 
altogether is two bytes, and the average number of neighbors Nave, then the total storage 
memory required is: 
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Storage = 10n + (7n+16)*Nave  (8.5) 
Chen et al. [68] indicated the storage for SAS , CAS, APR, DCARPS and EAC. We 
also calculated the storage for PhID, ACS, HIR and RHIR. All are listed in Table 4. The 
size of storage increases proportionally when the size of n increases. The most common 
hashing functions which are considered very secure are: MD4[92] which uses 128-bits 
digest, SHA-1[92] which uses 160-bits digest, and Whirlpool [92] which uses 512-bits 
digest [92].  
Table 8.1: Performance comparison. 
No Scheme Storage cost (bits) Computation cost 
1 SAS 2nN + 4nNave + 16 No hashing operations 
2 CAS 6n + 7nNave + 16 Two hashing orations and two 
encryptions 
3 HIR 2n+2nNave One hashing function 
4 RHIR 2n+2nNave+nkNave No hashing functions 
5 APR 9n + 7nNave + 2N - 2Nave - 2 Six hashing functions 
6 DCARPS  3n No hashing functions 
7 ACS 5nNave Two hashing functions 
8 PhID (3n+2)* Nave Four hashing function 
9 EAC 6n + 6nNave + 2 Four hashing operations 
10 FAC 10n + (7n+16)*Nave Four hashing operations & Oh 
encryptions 
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8.5. Processing and Computational Evaluation  
Hash functions are used to calculate the pseudonyms and symmetric cryptography 
is used to encrypt the messages. Because we need to calculate three pseudonyms and one 
acknowledgement pseudonym after each transmission, using encryption to create 
pseudonyms was avoided since it requires more processing power compared to hash 
functions. When a SN senses data, it needs to calculate four OWH for PID, OHPID, and 
APID at the sender and OHPID at the receiver. If the system opts for data authentication, 
then another hash function is needed. The source node needs only one encryption for the 
data if Oh=0, however, it needs Oh more encryptions if onion fashion is used. Each 
intermediary node needs one decryption operation and then another encryption to issue the 
new message. Chen et al. [68] indicates that SAS does not use hashing or encryption to 
create pseudonyms because it uses already created pseudonyms from a space. The other 
scheme by Chen et al. [68], CAS, uses two hashing operations and two encryption 
operations. APR uses at least six hashing functions. DCARPS uses constant IDs, so no 
hashing functions or encryptions for creating IDs. EAC has four hashing operations. It is 
clear that our framework needs a bit extra processing power due to the higher privacy and 
security we have achieved. None of the other schemes can achieve privacy against global 
threats and active adversary attacks. The power consumption due to the additional 
encryption operations is marginal compared to the power consumption caused by data 
transmission. Figure 8.9 exhibits different storage size for different privacy schemes which 
are discussed throughout this work. It shows that the increase in storage is linear and 
relatively comparable to the other protocols. The size of the storage would increase when 
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the number of neighbors increases. Each SN has limited flash memory size which could 
confine the maximum number of neighbors that a sensor can fit. As an example, TelosB 
mote [54, 68] has 1MB external flash memory. Thus, if one neighbor node requires 1.2k 
bits of storage memory, then TelosB could fit more than 800 neighbors which is way much 
more than what is needed in practical networks. Although FAC shows a bit of increase in 
the storage required to store the pseudonyms but it is the only one, among the discussed 
protocols in this work, provides a steady and functional anonymity and location privacy 
under strong global and active attack. In addition, the current technology provides sensors 
with sizable storage memory which makes it not an issue at all.  
 
Figure 8.9: Size of storage memory using different privacy schemes. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
FAC is a modular framework that provides source, link and sink anonymity. It also 
provides temporal privacy and rate privacy. None of the previous related-work have a 
comprehensive solution for anonymity and location privacy. The three modules provided 
in FAC are made work together to prevent any statistical analysis attacks. The quadruple 
privacy (anonymity, temporal, rate, statistical) has provided a fortified SLP and BLP. FAC 
has addressed both local and global adversary. We have used a complex anonymity module 
where pseudonyms to replace real IDs are used. To provide temporal privacy both delays 
and fake messages are used. The use of fake messages was adjusted to manage the energy 
consumption. Two schemes are introduced, SGAT and ECAT. FAC is able to handle both 
homogenous and heterogeneous sensor nodes. FAC is both energy-aware and delay-aware. 
We have demonstrated that FAC can withstand passive and active attacks by presenting 
scenarios and provided solutions. The memory cost was mathematically analyzed for the 
framework. The computational complexity for encryptions and hash functions was 
analyzed. To provide security for the BS against colluding active attacks, we have 
introduced onion encryptions. We have simulated the performance of the framework. The 
future work would include enhancement on the fake messages probabilistic scheme. In 
addition, we will implement FAC for different routing protocols such as clustered 
networks. We would plug FAC in some civil and military applications for further analysis, 
development and improvement.  One of the issues that any researcher in the area could face 
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is the lack of benchmarks to test the new proposed algorithms and protocols. There is a 
lack of standards and definitions for many terms. As an example, there is to specific 
definition for the global adversary. We do not know how feasible is having such an 
adversary in very large networks. There is no specific definition for how it works and what 
kind of timing it needs to capture a sensor node. The definitions of global, local, multi-
local adversary view are vague. There is no standard routing algorithms. The security and 
privacy of clustered networks is not often discussed. We believe that the scholars of this 
area need to cooperate and come up with some standard checks and test beds that future 
work needs to consider. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
101
REFERENCES 
[1] Z. A. Eu, H.-P. Tan, and W. K. G. Seah, "Design and performance analysis of MAC 
schemes for Wireless Sensor Networks Powered by Ambient Energy Harvesting," 
Ad Hoc Networks,2011,  vol. 9, pp. 300-323. 
[2] D. K. Noh and J. Hur, "Using a dynamic backbone for efficient data delivery in 
solar-powered WSNs," Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 2012 vol. 
35, pp. 1277-1284. 
[3] Y. Li and J. Ren, "Providing Source-Location Privacy in Wireless Sensor 
Networks," in Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications. vol. 5682, B. Liu, 
A. Bestavros, D.-Z. Du, and J. Wang, Eds., ed: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009, 
pp. 338-347. 
[4] M. Conti, J. Willemsen, and B. Crispo, "Providing Source Location Privacy in 
Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey," Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 
IEEE, 2013,  vol. 15, pp. 1238-1280. 
[5] M. A. Abuhelaleh, T. M. Mismar, and A. A. Abuzneid, "Armor-LEACH - Energy 
Efficient, Secure Wireless Networks Communication," in Proceedings of 17th 
International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks. ICCCN., 
2008, pp. 1-7. 
[6] A. Abuzneid, T. Sobh, and M. Faezipour, "Temporal Privacy Scheme for End-to-
End Location Privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks " presented at the Electrical, 
Electronics, Signals, Communiction & optimization EESCO-2015, pp 1-6. 
 
 
102
[7] A. Abuzneid, T. Sobh, and M. Faezipour, "An Enhanced Communication Protocol 
for Anonymity and Location Privacy in WSN," presented at the IEEE WCNC 2015, 
2015 pp, 1-6. 
[8] A.-S. Abuzneid, T. Sobh, M. Faezipour, A. Mahmood, and J. James, "Fortified 
Anonymous Communication Protocol for Location Privacy in WSN: A Modular 
Approach," Sensors, 2015, vol. 15, pp. 5820-5864. 
[9] A. A. Cardenas, T. Roosta, and S. Sastry, "Rethinking security properties, threat 
models, and the design space in sensor networks: A case study in SCADA systems," 
Ad Hoc Networks, 2009, vol. 7, pp. 1434-1447. 
[10] Y. Ouyang, Z. Le, D. Liu, J. Ford, and F. Makedon, "Source location privacy 
against laptop-class attacks in sensor networks," presented at the Proceedings of the 
4th international conference on Security and privacy in communication netowrks, 
Istanbul, Turkey, 2008. 
[11] A. Abbasi, A. Khonsari, and M. S. Talebi, "Source Location Anonymity for Sensor 
Networks," in 6th IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, 
CCNC 2009, pp. 1-5. 
[12] A. A. Nezhad, A. Miri, and D. Makrakis, "Location privacy and anonymity 
preserving routing for wireless sensor networks," Computer Networks, 2008, vol. 
52, pp. 3433-3452. 
[13] L. Yao, L. Kang, P. Shang, and G. Wu, "Protecting the sink location privacy in 
wireless sensor networks," Personal and Ubiquitous Computing, 2013, vol. 17, pp. 
883-893, 2013/06/01. 
 
 
103
[14] N. Li, N. Zhang, S. K. Das, and B. Thuraisingham, "Privacy preservation in 
wireless sensor networks: A state-of-the-art survey," Ad Hoc Networks, 2009, vol. 
7, pp. 1501-1514. 
[15] A. Pfitzmann and M. Köhntopp, "Anonymity, Unobservability, and Pseudonymity 
— A Proposal for Terminology," in Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies. 
vol. 2009, H. Federrath, Ed., ed: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2001, pp. 1-9. 
[16] P. Kamat, Y. Zhang, W. Trappe, and C. Ozturk, "Enhancing Source-Location 
Privacy in Sensor Network Routing," in Distributed Computing Systems. ICDCS . 
Proceedings. 25th IEEE International Conference on, 2005, pp. 599-608. 
[17] C. Ozturk, Y. Zhang, W. Trappe, and M. Ott, "Source-location privacy for networks 
of energy-constrained sensors," in Software Technologies for Future Embedded 
and Ubiquitous Systems. Proceedings. Second IEEE Workshop on, 2004, pp. 68-
72. 
[18] D. Jing, R. Han, and S. Mishra, "Countermeasures Against Traffic Analysis Attacks 
in Wireless Sensor Networks," in First International Conference on Security and 
Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks. SecureComm. , 2005, 
pp. 113-126. 
[19] J. Ying, C. Shigang, Z. Zhan, and Z. Liang, "A novel scheme for protecting 
receiver's location privacy in wireless sensor networks," IEEE Transactions on 
Wireless Communications, 2008, vol. 7, pp. 3769-3779. 
[20] L. Xinfeng, W. Xiaoyuan, Z. Nan, W. Zhiguo, and G. Ming, "Enhanced Location 
Privacy Protection of Base Station in Wireless Sensor Networks," in MSN. 5th 
 
 
104
International Conference on Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks., 2009, pp. 457-
464. 
[21] M. Raj, N. Li, D. Liu, M. Wright, and S. K. Das, "Using data mules to preserve 
source location privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks," Pervasive and Mobile 
Computing, 2014, vol. 11, pp. 244-260. 
[22] R. A. J. Shaikh, Hassan; D’Auriol, Brian J.; Lee, Heejo; Lee, Sungyoung; Song, 
Young-Jae., "Achieving Network Level Privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks.," 
Sensors, 2010, vol. 10, pp. 1447-1472. 
[23] S. Armenia, G. Morabito, and S. Palazzo, "Analysis of Location Privacy/Energy 
Efficiency Tradeoffs in Wireless Sensor Networks," in NETWORKING 2007. Ad 
Hoc and Sensor Networks, Wireless Networks, Next Generation Internet. vol. 4479, 
I. Akyildiz, R. Sivakumar, E. Ekici, J. Oliveira, and J. McNair, Eds., ed: Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg, 2007, pp. 215-226. 
[24] Y. Jianbo and W. Guangjun, "Preserving Source-Location Privacy in Energy-
Constrained Wireless Sensor Networks," in Distributed Computing Systems 
Workshops, 2008. ICDCS '08. 28th International Conference on, 2008, pp. 412-
416. 
[25] K. Lei, "Protecting Location Privacy in Large-Scale Wireless Sensor Networks," in 
Communications, 2009. ICC '09. IEEE International Conference on, 2009, pp. 1-
6. 
[26] P. Spachos, S. Liang, and D. Hatzinakos, "Opportunistic routing for enhanced 
source-location privacy in wireless sensor networks," in Communications (QBSC), 
2010 25th Biennial Symposium on, 2010, pp. 315-318. 
 
 
105
[27] W.-P. Wang, L. Chen, and J.-x. Wang, "A Source-Location Privacy Protocol in 
WSN Based on Locational Angle," in Communications, 2008. ICC '08. IEEE 
International Conference on, 2008, pp. 1630-1634. 
[28] L. Xi, J. Xu, and P. Myong-Soon, "Location Privacy against Traffic Analysis 
Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks," in International Conference on Information 
Science and Applications (ICISA). 2010, pp. 1-6. 
[29] X. Yong, L. Schwiebert, and S. Weisong, "Preserving source location privacy in 
monitoring-based wireless sensor networks," in Parallel and Distributed 
Processing Symposium,  2006, p. 1-8. 
[30] L. Yun and R. Jian, "Mixing Ring-Based Source-Location Privacy in Wireless 
Sensor Networks," in Computer Communications and Networks, 2009. ICCCN 
2009. Proceedings of 18th Internatonal Conference on, 2009, pp. 1-6. 
[31] L. Yun, L. Lightfoot, and R. Jian, "Routing-based source-location privacy 
protection in wireless sensor networks," in Electro/Information Technology, 2009. 
eit '09. IEEE International Conference on, 2009, pp. 29-34. 
[32] L. Zhang, "A self-adjusting directed random walk approach for enhancing source-
location privacy in sensor network routing," presented at the Proceedings of the 
2006 international conference on Wireless communications and mobile computing, 
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, 2006. 
[33] L. Lightfoot, L. Yun, and R. Jian, "Preserving Source-Location Privacy in Wireless 
Sensor Network Using STaR Routing," in Global Telecommunications Conference 
(GLOBECOM 2010), 2010 IEEE, 2010, pp. 1-5. 
 
 
106
[34] H. Xiaoyan, W. Pu, K. Jiejun, Z. Qunwei, and L. jun, "Effective probabilistic 
approach protecting sensor traffic," in IEEE Military Communications Conference. 
MILCOM., 2005, Vol. 1, pp. 169-175. 
[35] P. Kamat, W. Xu, W. Trappe, and Y. Zhang, "Temporal privacy in wireless sensor 
networks: Theory and practice," ACM Trans. Sen. Netw., 2009, vol. 5, pp. 1-24. 
[36] K. Mehta, L. Donggang, and M. Wright, "Location Privacy in Sensor Networks 
Against a Global Eavesdropper," in IEEE International Conference on Network 
Protocols. ICNP., 2007, pp. 314-323. 
[37] S. Min, Y. Yi, Z. Sencun, and C. Guohong, "Towards Statistically Strong Source 
Anonymity for Sensor Networks," in INFOCOM 2008. The 27th Conference on 
Computer Communications. IEEE, 2008. 
[38] Y. Yang, M. Shao, S. Zhu, B. Urgaonkar, and G. Cao, "Towards event source 
unobservability with minimum network traffic in sensor networks," presented at 
the Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security, 
Alexandria, VA, USA, 2008. 
[39] R. Doomun, T. Hayajneh, P. Krishnamurthy, and D. Tipper, "SECLOUD: Source 
and Destination Seclusion Using Clouds for wireless ad hoc networks," in 
Computers and Communications, 2009. ISCC 2009. IEEE Symposium on, 2009, 
pp. 361-367. 
[40] A. Majeed, L. Ke, and N. Abu-Ghazaleh, "TARP: Timing Analysis Resilient 
Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks," in Wireless and Mobile Computing, 
Networking and Communications, 2009. WIMOB 2009. IEEE International 
Conference on, 2009, pp. 85-90. 
 
 
107
[41] B. Alomair, A. Clark, J. Cuellar, and R. Poovendran, "Statistical Framework for 
Source Anonymity in Sensor Networks," in IEEE Global Telecommunications 
Conference. GLOBECOM., 2010, pp. 1-6. 
[42] C. Honglong and L. Wei, "From nowhere to somewhere: Protecting end-to-end 
location privacy in wireless sensor networks," in Performance Computing and 
Communications Conference (IPCCC), 2010 IEEE 29th International, 2010, pp. 1-
8. 
[43] L. Rongxing, L. Xiaodong, Z. Haojin, and S. Xuemin, "TESP2: Timed Efficient 
Source Privacy Preservation Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks," in IEEE 
International Conference on Communications. ICC., 2010, pp. 1-6. 
[44] G. Suarez-Tangil, E. Palomar, B. Ramos, and A. Ribagorda, "An experimental 
comparison of source location privacy methods for power optimization in WSNs," 
presented at the Proceedings of the 3rd WSEAS international conference on 
Advances in sensors, signals and materials, Faro, Portugal, 2010. 
[45] W. Yang and W. Zhu, "Protecting Source Location Privacy in Wireless Sensor 
Networks with Data Aggregation," in Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing. vol. 
6406, Z. Yu, R. Liscano, G. Chen, D. Zhang, and X. Zhou, Eds., ed: Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 252-266. 
[46] K. Bicakci, H. Gultekin, B. Tavli, and I. E. Bagci, "Maximizing lifetime of event-
unobservable wireless sensor networks," Computer Standards & Interfaces, 2011, 
vol. 33, pp. 401-410. 
 
 
108
[47] A. Jhumka, M. Leeke, and S. Shrestha, "On the Use of Fake Sources for Source 
Location Privacy: Trade-Offs Between Energy and Privacy," The Computer 
Journal, June 1, 2011, vol. 54, pp. 860-874. 
[48] S. Kokalj-Filipovic, F. Le Fessant, and P. Spasojevic, "The quality of source 
location protection in globally attacked sensor networks," in Pervasive Computing 
and Communications Workshops (PERCOM Workshops), 2011 IEEE International 
Conference on, 2011, pp. 44-49. 
[49] S. Ortolani, M. Conti, B. Crispo, and R. Di Pietro, "Events privacy in WSNs: A 
new model and its application," in World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia 
Networks (WoWMoM), 2011 IEEE International Symposium on a, 2011, pp. 1-9. 
[50] Y. Yang, Zhou, J., Deng, R.H., Bao, F., "Better security enforcement in trusted 
computing enabled heterogeneous wireless sensor networks," Security and 
Communication Networks, 2011, pp. 11-22. 
[51] M. M. E. A. Mahmoud and S. Xuemin, "A Cloud-Based Scheme for Protecting 
Source-Location Privacy against Hotspot-Locating Attack in Wireless Sensor 
Networks," Parallel and Distributed Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 2012, vol. 23, 
pp. 1805-1818. 
[52] L. Kazatzopoulos, C. Delakouridis, G. F. Marias, and P. Georgiadis, "iHIDE: 
hiding sources of information in WSNs," in Security, Privacy and Trust in 
Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing, 2006. SecPerU 2006. Second International 
Workshop on, 2006, pp. 8 pp.-48. 
[53] O. Yi, L. Zhengyi, C. Guanling, J. Ford, and F. Makedon, "Entrapping adversaries 
for source protection in sensor networks," in World of Wireless, Mobile and 
 
 
109
Multimedia Networks, 2006. WoWMoM 2006. International Symposium on a, 2006, 
pp. 10 pp.-34. 
[54] S. M. a. G. Xue, "Efficient anonymity schemes for clustered wireless sensor 
networks," Int. J. Sensor Networks, 2006, vol. 1. 
[55] O. Yi, L. Zhengyi, X. Yurong, N. Triandopoulos, Z. Sheng, J. Ford, et al., 
"Providing Anonymity in Wireless Sensor Networks," in Pervasive Services, IEEE 
International Conference on, 2007, pp. 145-148. 
[56] S. Jang-Ping, J. Jehm-Ruey, and T. Ching, "Anonymous Path Routing in Wireless 
Sensor Networks," in IEEE International Conference on Communications. ICC., 
2008, pp. 2728-2734. 
[57] R. Di Pietro and A. Viejo, "Location privacy and resilience in wireless sensor 
networks querying," Computer Communications, 2011, vol. 34, pp. 515-523. 
[58] J.-H. Park, Y.-H. Jung, H. Ko, J.-J. Kim, and M.-S. Jun, "A Privacy Technique for 
Providing Anonymity to Sensor Nodes in a Sensor Network," in Ubiquitous 
Computing and Multimedia Applications. vol. 150, T.-h. Kim, H. Adeli, R. Robles, 
and M. Balitanas, Eds., ed: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011, pp. 327-335. 
[59] S. Min, H. Wenhui, Z. Sencun, C. Guohong, S. Krishnamurth, and T. La Porta, 
"Cross-layer Enhanced Source Location Privacy in Sensor Networks," in Sensor, 
Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks, 2009. SECON '09. 6th Annual 
IEEE Communications Society Conference on, 2009, pp. 1-9. 
[60] H. Wang, B. Sheng, and Q. Li, "Privacy-aware routing in sensor networks," 
Computer Networks, 2009, vol. 53, pp. 1512-1529. 
 
 
110
[61] F. Yanfei, C. Jiming, L. Xiaodong, and S. Xuemin, "Preventing Traffic Explosion 
and Achieving Source Unobservability in Multi-Hop Wireless Networks Using 
Network Coding," in Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM 
2010), 2010 IEEE, 2010, pp. 1-5. 
[62] F. Yanfei, J. Yixin, Z. Haojin, and S. Xuemin, "An Efficient Privacy-Preserving 
Scheme against Traffic Analysis Attacks in Network Coding," in INFOCOM 2009, 
IEEE, 2009, pp. 2213-2221. 
[63] R. El-Badry, A. Sultan, and M. Youssef, "HyberLoc: Providing Physical Layer 
Location Privacy in Hybrid Sensor Networks," in Communications (ICC), 2010 
IEEE International Conference on, 2010, pp. 1-5. 
[64] R. El-Badry, M. Youssef, and M. Eltoweissy, "Hidden Anchor: Providing Physical 
Layer Location Privacy in Hybrid Wireless Sensor Networks," in New 
Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS), 2009 3rd International Conference 
on, 2009, pp. 1-5. 
[65] R. Rios and J. Lopez, "Exploiting Context-Awareness to Enhance Source-Location 
Privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks," The Computer Journal, October 1, 2011, 
vol. 54, pp. 1603-1615. 
[66] O. Sangho and M. Gruteser, "Multi-node coordinated jamming for location privacy 
protection," in MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE, 2011, pp. 1243-
1249. 
[67] B. Tavli, M. M. Ozciloglu, and K. Bicakci, "Mitigation of Compromising Privacy 
by Transmission Range Control in Wireless Sensor Networks," Communications 
Letters, IEEE, 2010, vol. 14, pp. 1104-1106. 
 
 
111
[68] J. Chen, X. Du, and B. Fang, "An efficient anonymous communication protocol for 
wireless sensor networks," Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing, 
2012, vol. 12, pp. 1302-1312. 
[69] S. Misra and X. Guoliang, "SAS: A Simple Anonymity Scheme for Clustered 
Wireless Sensor Networks," in Communications, 2006. ICC '06. IEEE 
International Conference on, 2006, pp. 3414-3419. 
[70] B. Alomair, A. Clark, J. Cuellar, and R. Poovendran, "Toward a Statistical 
Framework for Source Anonymity in Sensor Networks," IEEE Transactions on 
Mobile Computing., 2013, vol. 12, pp. 248-260. 
[71] J. Kong and X. Hong, "ANODR: anonymous on demand routing with untraceable 
routes for mobile ad-hoc networks," presented at the Proceedings of the 4th ACM 
international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing., Annapolis, 
Maryland, USA, 2003. 
[72] Kerckhoffs’ Principle. Available from: 
http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Kerckhoffs%27_Principle (accessed on 1 March 
2015).  
[73] Z. Yanchao, L. Wei, L. Wenjing, and F. Yuguang, "Location-based compromise-
tolerant security mechanisms for wireless sensor networks," Selected Areas in 
Communications, IEEE Journal on, 2006, vol. 24, pp. 247-260. 
[74] L. Rongxing, L. Xiaodong, Z. Chenxi, Z. Haojin, H. Pin-Han, and S. Xuemin, 
"AICN: An Efficient Algorithm to Identify Compromised Nodes in Wireless 
Sensor Network," in IEEE International Conference on Communications. ICC., 
2008, pp. 1499-1504. 
 
 
112
[75] H. Song, L. Xie, S. Zhu, and G. Cao, "Sensor node compromise detection: the 
location perspective," presented at the Proceedings of the 2007 international 
conference on Wireless communications and mobile computing, Honolulu, Hawaii, 
USA, 2007. 
[76] L. Tao, S. Min, and M. Alam, "Compromised Sensor Nodes Detection: A 
Quantitative Approach," in 28th International Conference on Distributed 
Computing Systems Workshops. ICDCS. , 2008, pp. 352-357. 
[77] S. Zhu, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia, "LEAP+: Efficient security mechanisms for large-
scale distributed sensor networks," ACM Trans. Sen. Netw., 2006, vol. 2, pp. 500-
528. 
[78] I. Mabrouki and A. Belghith, "E-SeRLoc: An enhanced serloc localization 
algorithm with reduced computational complexity," in 9th International Wireless 
Communications and Mobile Computing Conference. IWCMC., 2013, pp. 153-158. 
[79] L. Lazos and R. Poovendran, "SeRLoc: secure range-independent localization for 
wireless sensor networks," presented at the Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop 
on Wireless security, Philadelphia, PA, USA, 2004. 
[80] C. Juan, Z. Hongli, F. Binxing, D. Xiaojiang, Y. Lihua, and Y. Xiangzhan, 
"Towards Efficient Anonymous Communications in Sensor Networks," in IEEE 
Global Telecommunications Conference. GLOBECOM., 2011, pp. 1-5. 
[81] W. Zheng, S. Gao, L. Qiu, and W. Zhang, "A CDS-based topology control 
algorithm in energy efficient Clustering," in 31st Chinese Control Conference. 
CCC. , 2012, pp. 6605-6610. 
 
 
113
[82] D. Hongwei, W. Weili, Y. Qiang, L. Deying, L. Wonjun, and X. Xuepeng, "CDS-
Based Virtual Backbone Construction with Guaranteed Routing Cost in Wireless 
Sensor Networks," IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems., 2013, 
vol. 24, pp. 652-661. 
[83] A. Abduvaliyev, A. S. K. Pathan, Z. Jianying, R. Roman, and W. Wai-Choong, "On 
the Vital Areas of Intrusion Detection Systems in Wireless Sensor Networks," IEEE 
Communications Surveys & Tutorials., 2013, vol. 15, pp. 1223-1237. 
[84] L. YangXia and G. Ye, "A Survey on Intrusion Detection of Wireless Sensor 
Network," in 2nd International Conference on Information Science and 
Engineering. ICISE., 2010, pp. 1798-1802. 
[85] P. Kamat, Y. Zhang, W. Trappe, and C. Ozturk, "Enhancing Source-Location 
Privacy in Sensor Network Routing," in Distributed Computing Systems. ICDCS. 
Proceedings. 25th IEEE International Conference on, 2005, pp. 599-608. 
[86] P.-C. Wu, "Multiplicative, congruential random-number generators with multiplier 
" ACM Trans. Math. Softw., 1997,  vol. 23, pp. 255-265. 
[87] L.-Y. Deng, C. Rousseau, and Y. Yuan, "Generalized Lehmer-Tausworthe random 
number generators," presented at the Proceedings of the 30th annual Southeast 
regional conference, Raleigh, North Carolina, 1992. 
[88] W. H. Payne, J. R. Rabung, and T. P. Bogyo, "Coding the Lehmer pseudo-random 
number generator," Commun. ACM, 1969, vol. 12, pp. 85-86. 
[89] J. Chen, X. Du, and B. Fang, "An efficient anonymous communication protocol for 
wireless sensor networks," Wirel. Commun. Mob. Comput., 2012, vol. 12, pp. 1302-
1312. 
 
 
114
[90] W. R. Heinzelman, A. Chandrakasan, and H. Balakrishnan, "Energy-efficient 
communication protocol for wireless microsensor networks," in Proceedings of the 
33rd Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences., 2000. 
[91] C. Shuguang, A. J. Goldsmith, and A. Bahai, "Energy-constrained modulation 
optimization," Wireless Communications, IEEE Transactions on, 2005, vol. 4, pp. 
2349-2360. 
[92] W. Stallings, Network Security Essentials, 3rd ed.: Prentice Hall, 2007. 
 
 
